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In Brown u. Board of Education' the Supreme Court said that
because of "the importance of education to our democratic society ...
the opportunity of an education ... where the State has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. '2 The unanimous Brown opinion thus indicated that "equal
educational opportunity" was a constitutional right.' From the perspec-
tive of today's complexity, the legal issue raised in Brown seems
relatively simple: whether state-imposed segregated schooling denies
black children equal protection of the laws, even though the segregated
public schools are equal in terms of physical facilities, resources, and
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1956, Bryn Mawr, LL.B. 1966, Yale
University. This Article was originally presented as the Simon E. Sobeloff Memorial
Lecture at the University of Maryland School of Law on April 18, 1979. To be invited to
give a lecture at the University of Maryland would have been honor enough, but to have
been asked to give the first lecture to memorialize Judge Simon E. Sobeloff was more than
an ordinary honor. It was a task upon which I embarked with great trepidation, not just
because he was such a distinguished jurist, but because Judge Sobeloff, whom I served as
law clerk in 1966-67, was my mentor and very dear friend. Although I could not begin to
aspire to the wit, the graceful prose, the incisive analysis, and the sprightly sense of
humor with which Judge Sobeloff would attack a subject, I hope that I bring to my topic
that concern for human liberty and dignity and that reverence for the Constitution and the
American democratic traditions that he tried to impart to his law clerks and to all of us.
The comments of several colleagues were very helpful in preparing the lecture. I
particularly wish to thank Professors Walter E. Dellinger and Thomas D. Rowe of the
Duke University School of Law. I also wish to acknowledge the very able research
assistance of Douglas Carter, Stephen Kern, and Gail Rising, law students at Duke
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
3. Equal educational opportunity was also an issue in several earlier cases such as
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). These pre-Brown cases were mainly concerned with the
equal aspect of "separate but equal," while Brown focused on the separation itself as
affecting the educational opportunities of minority students.
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other tangible factors.' In the context of that case, equal educational
opportunity meant at least an education provided on a non-segregated
basis.
What else the concept of "equal educational opportunity" might
mean, we - society, the legal community, the political institutions -
have never resolved. Both the courts and Congress have struggled to
define the concept, and the result has been varying definitions at
different times. The question is a troubling one, whether we are
concerned only with that equality of educational opportunity that is
constitutionally protected or, beyond the constitutional minimum, with
that amount of education that as a just society we should provide for all
children. And at times we have confused the legal imperative with the
moral imperative.
Focusing first on that educational opportunity that the fourteenth
amendment protects, we find that there are several possible definitions.
Equal educational opportunity could mean simply making available to
all children the same books, teachers, and facilities. Education could be
thought of as a dinner placed on a platter and then offered to the child,
leaving it up to the child to help himself. The opportunity is made
available by the state, but the responsibility to do something with it is
the child's. This is a minimal definition of equal educational oppor-
tunity.'
Is the system constitutionally obligated to go farther, to provide
extra help to those who cannot help themselves to what is on the
platter? Is it the responsibility of the school system to give the child a
spoon if he does not have one of his own? For instance, must the system
provide free textbooks or waive laboratory fees for indigent students?' If
4. It is unclear whether Brown stands for the proposition that segregated schools
deny whites as well as blacks equal protection. Cf. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (white tenants alleging owner's racially discriminatory renting
practices denied them the benefits of living in an integrated community granted standing
to sue); Equal Educational Opportunity; Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal
Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1970) (statement of Dr. Kenneth Clark):
If we are realistically to move toward planning and implementing serious programs
for the desegregation of American public schools and related institutions in our
society, we must now begin to examine very carefully and to present honestly and
clearly the evidence which suggests the deep, insidious damage which segregated
schools and segregated institutions inflict upon privileged white children.
There is strong evidence to suggest that racial segregation, which is in fact the
institutionalization of racism in America, is flagrantly and insidiously detrimental to
privileged middle class and working class white children.
Id. at 73.
5. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 414
U.S. 563 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Carpio v. Tucson High School Dist. No. 1, 111 Ariz. 127, 524 P.2d 948
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 982 (1975).
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the child comes to school with his hands wrapped in bandages through
no fault of the school system, should it be required to spoon-feed him?
The analogy here, of course, is to physical or mental handicaps or the
handicapping conditions of poverty,8 or isolation - isolation because of
ethnicity, as with some Indian students, or because of circumstances, as
with migrant workers' children.
Is the government constitutionally obligated to ensure that each
school or each school district has the same offering on the platter, or
only that each district has sufficient funds to provide a full offering,
allowing each district to decide for itself whether it wants to include
dessert or spend the dessert money on health care for the aged?9
Finally, in perhaps a shift from the legal to the moral imperative or
to an intermingling of the two, we may ask whether the societal concern
for the problems of autistic children or migrant workers' children
demands that those problems be redressed through the public schools.
Why do we focus on that institution? Who should bear the economic and
social costs of redressing these problems? And who decides that society
must redress these problems, in a world of finite resources, rather than
some other problem?
This Article examines some of the constitutional and political
considerations that affect the answers to these questions and the
implications of some of the answers. In addition, it analyzes the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,10 in which the Court refused to find a basic
constitutional entitlement to an education. The refusal of the Court to
find an affirmative governmental duty to equalize differences in wealth
or differences in educational services resulting from differences in
wealth, or even a duty to provide education at all, disappointed those
groups seeking educational equity and led to a search for alternative
ways of achieving their objectives. This Article reviews the post-
Rodriguez litigation concerning the right to an education and Congress'
legislative attempts to expand the entitlement to a certain amount and
7. See, e.g., Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub noma. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
9. The extent to which "local choice" may be permitted to determine the quality of a
child's education is one of the principal questions in recent school finance litigation. See,
e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 610-11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 620 (1971); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 377, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820, cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 665
(1980).
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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kind of education, and suggests some of the political and institutional
problems raised by these approaches to equal educational opportunity.
As a result of Rodriguez, then, we are left with the question
whether equal educational opportunity, however defined, is a constitu-
tional mandate. If Brown is reduced to a case about state-imposed
discrimination on the basis of race rather than a case about education,"
as the majority's decision in Rodriguez seems to imply, there is no
consistent approach to the education for which various disadvantaged
groups are competing, no consistent theory as tt who is disadvantaged
in this context, and no consistent theory of that equality - and
concomitant governmental duty - that is their entitlement.
If the Supreme Court had decided that education was a constitution-
al right, and a majority might well have done so if the Court had not
been blinded by a concern that it would have to legislate what is
education, then the focus might have been on that education that is
essential for all children. This focus would have provided a context in
which to treat those kinds of children who need special help, yet perhaps
with less divisiveness and more emphasis on quality education for all
children than now exists.
Thus, this Article explores an alternative model on which to base a
finding that the federal equal protection clause guarantees an educa-
tional opportunity. The Supreme Court's reluctance to find that
education is a fundamental right entitled to special protection was at
least in part due to the Court's fear that there are no judicially
manageable standards for determining what amount of education is
constitutionally guaranteed. The recent school finance cases decided on
state constitutional grounds may provide the model for a judicially
articulated standard for determining when the federal equal protection
clause has been violated without involving courts in issues of education-
al policy. A more politically promising approach for Congress is also
drawn from these state cases.
I. THE Rodriguez DECISION
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 " involved a
challenge to the Texas school finance system, under which local school
11. The numerous decisions that followed Brown, striking down racial separation in
noneducation areas, suggest that race may have been the critical factor in that decision.
See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (parks); New Orleans City Park
Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903
(1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Mayor of
Baltimore v. Davison, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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districts are delegated authority by the state legislature to raise funds
for education by levying a tax on property located within the district.
Because of significant differences in property wealth among school
districts, the system results in large disparities in per pupil expendi-
tures, despite some subventions from the state. The plaintiffs, relying on
the equal protection clause, sought to have education revenues redistrib-
uted on a wealth-neutral basis,'3 so that the quality of education would
not be related to the per pupil property wealth of school districts. The
Supreme Court held, however, that a state system of financing
education that produced relative differences in the quality of education
among school districts within a state did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Before turning to a discussion of the Court's holding and its
implications, it may be useful to explore two legal theories of equal
protection, both of which may be traced to Brown v. Board of
Education,4 under which an equal educational opportunity was thought
to be constitutionally protected.
A. The Theories Underlying a Fourteenth Amendment Right to an
Equal Educational Opportunity
1. Protected Classes
A substantial gloss has been built up around the fourteenth
amendment's seemingly simple equal protection clause. The clause has
been interpreted as a broad regulation of the way in which the
government discriminates among classes in allocating its burdens and
benefits. Equal protection doctrine, then, understandably concerns itself
with two things: the nature of the discrimination, that is, the division of
people into classes for the purpose of differential application of the
law, and the nature of the burdens or benefits involved.
The first theory advanced in Rodriguez centers on the class being
denied an equal educational opportunity. Certain classifications trigger
a more exacting judicial scrutiny than others, imposing on the state a
heavy burden of justifying them. Other classifications are presumed
13. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 91 Cal. Rptr. 601,
604 (1971). The "fiscal neutrality" principle was first articulated in J. Coons, W. Clune III,
& S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (1970). For a discussion of this
principle and its subsequent development, see Levin, Current Trends in School Finance
Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099. Advocates of "fiscal neutrality"
see it as a simple equal protection test. A state school finance scheme satisfies the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause as long as the amount a district spends is
not a function of its wealth.
14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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constitutional unless the party challenging the legislation can show that
the state had no rational basis for the classification in question.
Obviously, then, the characterization of the class determines the
outcome of the constitutional challenge. If the class can be characterized
as one entitled to special protection, the legislation that has established
the classification is subjected to close judicial scrutiny.15 If there is no
compelling governmental objective, or if that objective can be achieved
by less restrictive alternatives, the statute is unconstitutional. 6
The argument that there are classes that deserve some special
judicial protection, "suspect classes," was foreshadowed in United States
v. Carolene Products Co.17 The Supreme Court said that the rational
basis test for legislation, that is, the presumption that legislation is
constitutional, might not be appropriate in every case: "[Pirejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." The Supreme
Court has held that classifications based on race, 9 national origin,2 0 and
- in some circumstances - alienage2' will trigger more careful review,
almost regardless of the significance of the interest affected, whether
access to public schools22 or to public golf courses. 3
Other classifications, such as those based on gender2 4 and
illegitimacy,2' have been treated as entitled to a standard of review
15. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see Developments in the
Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1120 (1969).
16. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973).
17. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
18. Id. at 153 n.4 (dictum).
19. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967). See also Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
20. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
21. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); cf. Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) ([TIhe power of a state to apply its laws
exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits."). However,
the Court's "scrutiny will not be so demanding" in circumstances involving "a State's
historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institu-
tions." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding state statute prohibiting employment of aliens as elementary
and secondary school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (upholding state
statute prohibiting employment of aliens as policemen).
22. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
24. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
25. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510
(1976) (Illegitimacy classifications fall into a "realm of less than strictest scrutiny," but
this scrutiny "is not a toothless one.").
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somewhere between strict scrutiny and "rational basis." This standard
requires the governmental interest at stake to be substantially related
(rather than absolutely necessary) to achieving an important (but not
compelling) governmental interest. Intermediate scrutiny also requires
the government to show that its important interest could not be
accomplished by less discriminatory alternatives. 6 Again, the
individual's interest affected by the classification need not itself be
significant: it may be equal access to academically elite schools27 or
equal access to 3.2 beer.2"
Some classifications, age, for example, have been unambiguously
held not entitled to any special protection. 9 In these cases the
discriminatory legislation is presumed constitutional. To counter this
presumption, plaintiffs must show that the classification is wholly
arbitrary and irrational, a burden they are unlikely to meet.
The classifications the Supreme Court has treated least clearly are
those based on wealth. No Supreme Court decision has applied the strict
scrutiny test to a wealth classification that did not also involve a
significant individual interest, which of course shifts the equal
protection focus away from the classification and onto the interest
26. As the Supreme Court stated in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 772 n.14 (1977):
"[W]e would have a different case if the state statute were carefully tailored to eliminate
imprecise and unduly burdensome methods of establishing paternity." See Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender discrimination
cases); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,
636 (1974) (illegitimacy cases).
27. In Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974), the Ninth Circuit, addressing this issue, did not clearly state which standard of
scrutiny it was using, but the court's discussion of the issue and its citation of Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), suggest that "the task is to examine the school district's
assertion that the standard of past academic achievement substantially furthers the
purpose of providing the best education possible. . . . The Court [in Reed] indicated that
sex classifications are to be tested on the basis of strict rationality. ... 501 F.2d at
1267, 1269.
28. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). With those classifications entitled to
intermediate level review, however, there are indications that only absolute denial of some
benefit will be closely examined. Mere imposition of a greater burden on the class may be
subject simply to a rational basis test. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)
(upholding Social Security Act provision requiring certain illegitimate children to show
that deceased wage earner was both child's parent and was supporting child at time of
death in order to be eligible for survivors' benefits, whereas legitimate children are
entitled to presumption of dependency). Courts may not even closely scrutinize separate,
segregated access to a benefit as long as the benefit is provided equally. See, e.g.,
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3rd Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided
Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (gender classifications for admissions to separate but equal
academic public high schools upheld because equal opportunity was extended to each sex
and restriction applied to both).
29. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
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affected. In some cases, that interest has been an independent
constitutional right, such as interstate travel. 0 In others, it has been a
right so closely related to specific constitutional rights that it appears to
be a right implicit in the Constitution itself, such as the right to vote31 or
the right to marry.2 In still other cases, the interest involved may have
overtones of fundamental fairness, such as the interest in an effective
criminal appeal.3 3 Equal protection analysis of wealth classifications has
been further obscured by the fact that wealth and racial classifications
often coincide.3' Whether wealth classifications alone could ever be
suspect or even of a character entitling them to intermediate-level
scrutiny is unresolved.
2. Protected Interests
The second method that has been used to flesh out the equal
protection clause is to treat certain interests as being of sufficient
importance that they are constitutionally protected 5 If an interest is
characterized as "fundamental," it must be provided to all equally
unless the state can justify discriminatory legislation by showing that it
30. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 177-81 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (statute that prohibits bringing indigents into
the state is invalid infringment on right of interstate travel).
31. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (invalidating requirement of filing fee
for access to ballot); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating
state poll tax).
32. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating statute requiring
persons obligated to support out-of-custody children to obtain court approval before
marrying, as right to marry held to be of "fundamental importance"); cf. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process clause prohibits state from denying
indigents seeking a divorce access to courts because they cannot pay court fees, as
"marriage involves interests of basic importance in our society").
33. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (state must provide indigents
with counsel on direct appeal of criminal conviction); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17
(1956) (state must furnish trial transcript to indigent without cost, as "the central aim of
our entire judicial system [is that] all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is
concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court' ").
34. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
35. When the issue is governmental infringement of a "fundamental" interest, the
relevance of the equal protection clause becomes problematical. In some cases, the
question of a governmental classification is irrelevant: for example, the right of marital
privacy or the right to decide whether to bear a child may not be interfered with by the
government without a compelling justification, whether the interference is applicable to
all or only to some. In such cases the issue is often framed in terms of the due process
clause. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). At other times, however, the issue is still framed in terms of the equal protection
clause, and it is the unequal treatment that invalidates the infringement of the
fundamental interest. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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is necessary to the attainment of a compelling governmental objective
that cannot be achieved by less restrictive alternatives. The denial of
other interests, whether to all or only to certain groups, is presumed
constitutional unless the party challenging the legislation can show that
the state's objective is not a legitimate one. When the challenge to the
constitutionality of legislation impinging on certain interests is based on
the equal protection clause, the characterization of the classification
affected may also be relevant,36 so that at times the two theories appear
to merge into a hybrid theory.
As with the characterization of classes, it is clear that the
characterization of the interest determines the outcome of the constitu-
tional challenge. If the interest is not characterized as fundamental,
then the challenger is unlikely to meet with success even if he can show
that the government's objective is insubstantial and could be accom-
plished by less restrictive alternatives.
The rights of interstate travel,37 procreation,H and equal treatment
with regard to voting 9 and criminal appeals 4 have been declared to be
fundamental interests, but the Supreme Court has declined to extend
similar treatment to basic subsistence needs such as welfare, 4 housing,'4 2
employment,' and with its decision in the Rodriguez case, education."
These latter interests have been characterized as matters of social and
economic policy, not fundamental interests firmly rooted in the Consti-
tution and thereby entitled to special judicial protection." This Article
36. See Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
37. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Dunn v.
Blumstei'n, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972).
39. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (residency requirement); Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1969) (denial of franchise to those without
children in school or who do not own property); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55, 562 (1964)
(legislative reapportionment).
40. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956); cf. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963) (striking down California practice of providing counsel for appeals
of right for indigents only after a preliminary examination by the court of merits of
appeal).
41. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970).
42. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
43. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976).
44. 411 U.S. at 37.
45. Nevertheless, as Professor Michelman has ably illustrated, there are hints in
some of the Supreme Court opinions that suggest that basic subsistence needs are to be
given greater weight on the scale of interests than most others. Michelman, Welfare Rights
in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 663-64.
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explores the problems of the fundamental interest analysis as it is
applied to education." One of the questions explored is whether, even if
"education" can be characterized as a fundamental interest, there are
judicially manageable standards for determining whether the Constitu-
tion guarantees a particular amount or quality of education for all
children, a minimum or basic amount of education, or an educa-
tion that is absolutely equal to the education that anyone else
receives.
3. Equal Protection Theory in the Context of Equal Educational
Opportunity
Two other aspects of the question whether there is a constitutional
right to an equal educational opportunity seem to depart from the
traditional view of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause:
whether the constitutional violation arises from government-permitted
relative differences in education or only from governmental failure to
provide any education at all, and whether the Constitution imposes on
the state an affirmative duty to provide extra educational services to
particular groups rather than merely requiring that the state cease
discriminating against these groups in the provision of education. The
traditional view of the equal protection clause is that it provides a right
not to be treated differently by government - because of certain traits
or characteristics - than others are treated. The standard is a negative
one. The government has an obligation not to install barriers that
prevent certain classes of children from obtaining the same education
that all other children are receiving. For example, otherwise qualified
children of Chinese background cannot be excluded from the classroom
and the school solely because of their national origin. Children who live
in certain areas of the state cannot be denied an education when the
state provides an education to all other children within the state.47 This
traditional negative standard seems to apply most appropriately to cases
46. There is a vast body of literature criticizing the Court's use of fundamental
interests. E.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971); Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the
Law to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 741. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 662 (Harlan, J., dissenting). There is, in addition, a body of literature seeking a basis
for locating such rights or interests in the Constitution. E.g., Ely, Foreword: On
Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); Michelman, Foreword: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969);
Michelman, supra note 45. This Article will largely refrain from replowing this ground.
47. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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in which access to a benefit has been denied outright. However,
plaintiffs in cases in which the question is one of degree, where
government provided lower quality services or imposed somewhat
greater burdens," have also been able to have the negative standard
applied. These cases concern relative differences in services rather than
the absolute denial of such services, but the view of the equal protection
clause is really the same. Equal protection merely passively prohibits
state-sanctioned discrimination and requires identical treatment.
An approach that goes beyond the plain language of the equal
protection clause - that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 9 - is one that imposes an
affirmative duty on the government to remove a barrier not necessarily
of the government's making, such as poverty or limited English
language ability. Under this interpretation, the government has a duty
to treat people differently. For example, children who speak only
Chinese may be constitutionally entitled to special educational
programs, since they cannot understand what goes on in the regular
classroom where only English is spoken. If they do not receive special
treatment, the argument goes, they do not have an opportunity equal to
that of others to take advantage of the education the government offers
to all.5° The denial of equal protection of the laws then arises because the
government fails to classify them and treat them differently than all
other schoolchildren.
These latter two approaches to equal educational opportunity - the
focus on relative differences in, rather than exclusion from or absolute
deprivation of, education and the focus on an affirmative duty to provide
special, additional services for certain groups - are among the main
48. E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (equal protection denied
by educational "tracking" system that placed disproportionate number of blacks into
slower learning tracks where they received a "watered down" curriculum), affd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.
1972) (action brought by black and Puerto Rican residents alleging that New York City
unconstitutionally discriminated against them by failing to maintain neighborhood park
to standard equivalent to other community parks in the Bronx).
49. U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1.
50. Circuit Judge Hufstedler, dissenting in Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 806 (9th Cir.
1973), rev'd, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), argued the point aptly:
The majority opinion concedes that the children who speak no English receive no
education and those who are given some help in English cannot receive the same
education as their English speaking classmates. In short, discrimination is admitted.
Discriminatory treatment is not constitutionally impermissible, they say, because all
children are offered the same educational fare, i.e., equal treatment of unequals
satisfies the demands of equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause is not so feeble.
Invidious discrimination is not washed away because the able bodied and the
paraplegic are given the same state command to walk.
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weapons of those seeking judicial approval of a broad definition for what
equal educational opportunity is constitutionally required. This Article
explores the judicial and legislative reactions to these arguments.
B. The Rodriguez Decision
1. The Suspect Class Argument
In order to trigger the "strict scrutiny" equal protection standard of
judicial review, the plaintiffs in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez5 1 sought to persuade the Supreme Court that the state's
school financing legislation discriminated on the basis of wealth, a
"suspect" classification. The plaintiffs had before them the legacy of the
Carolene Products footnote. 52 In addition, there were the criminal
appeals and voting rights cases decided by the Warren Court holding
that classifications based on wealth were to be strictly scrutinized.5
Thus it is not surprising that the plaintiffs attempted to characterize the
class being discriminated against in Rodriguez - those students who
lived in low-property wealth school districts - as a suspect classifica-
tion based on wealth, and hence entitled to the strict scrutiny standard
of equal protection review.
The Court, however, held that Texas' system of financing schools
did not discriminate against any class of persons considered suspect. In
its view, the subject of the classification was property-poor districts, not
poor persons.' The injured class was said to be comprised of all students
who lived in low-property wealth school districts, rather than indigent
students who might live in either low- or high-property wealth districts
or indigent students who lived in property-poor school districts. Justice
Powell, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that the precedents
involving wealth discrimination had been confined to discrimination on
the basis of personal wealth. 55 Moreover, the class in Rodriguez was not
51. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
52. See notes 17 & 18 and accompanying text supra.
53. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In Harper the Court,
in striking down the poll tax, said that "[l ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property,
like those of race ..., are traditionally disfavored." 383 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). This, plus such encouraging dicta as that used by the Warren Court in
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), to the effect that wealth and
race are "factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect," id. at
807 (emphasis added), obviously led to expectations that wealth classifications generally
would be treated as suspect and thus demanding of strict judicial scrutiny, despite the fact
that the Warren Court cases dealt solely with access to the political and judicial processes.
54. 411 U.S. at 22-23, 25-28.
55. Id. at 20.
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the kind to which special judicial protection is generally provided; it was
not a politically powerless discrete and insular minority.' As the Court
put it, a class is suspect if it is "saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordi-
nary protection from the majoritarian political process." 57
The Court's holding that the Texas school finance system did not
disadvantage any class that could be identified as "suspect" has been
criticized on several grounds.' First, the Court noted that individual
income did not always correlate with district property wealth,59 but most
studies show that although the correlation is not perfect, there is
generally a strong correlation between low income and low property
wealth.' Even if a strong correlation between personal wealth and
district wealth had been shown, however, the majority noted, the cases
relied upon by plaintiffs in which the strict scrutiny standard had been
applied to wealth discrimination had all involved absolute deprivations
of rights rather than relative differences." Thus, the Court articulated a
56. Id. at 27-28; see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4
(1938) (dictum).
57. 411 U.S. at 28.
58. See, eg., Clune, Wealth Discrimination in School Finance, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 651
(1973); Coons, Introduction: "Fiscal Neutrality" After Rodriguez, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
299 (1974).
59. 411 U.S. at 23. The Court cited a recent Connecticut school district study, reported
in Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972). The study demonstrated, according to the Court,
"that the poor were clustered around commercial and industrial areas - those same areas
that provide the most attractice sources of property tax income for school districts." 411
U.S. at 23. Two social scientists, however, have attacked the statistical methodology upon
which the study relies, noting, inter alia, misinterpretation of correlation coefficients, lack
of coefficients, lack of weighted variables resulting in a failure to account for the size of
each district, and analysis based on local, not total, expenditures. Grubb & Michelson,
Public School Finance in a Post-Serrano World, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 550 (1973). In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall criticized the Court for drawing conclusions about
Texas on the basis of a study of Connecticut, as well as for allowing the state to relitigate
data in the Supreme Court that went unchallenged in the district court. 411 U.S. at 95
n.56.
60. E.g., B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON & M. COHEN, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE;
PRESENT DISPAtrriES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES (1972) (report prepared for the President's
Commission on School Finance) [hereinafter cited as B. LEVIN]. This study indicates that
in most states, there is a strong correlation between low per capita income and low per
pupil property values, particularly in rural areas.
61. 411 U.S. at 20-22. The Court cited Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (payment
for transcripts for appeal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (payment for counsel
for appeal); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (imprisonment for inability to pay




new limit on finding discrimination on the basis of wealth. Not only
must the discrimination be against a precisely defined class of indigents,
but the deprivation must be absolute. No student was absolutely
deprived of an education under the Texas system.2 The differences in
educational quality among school districts were relative, and the Court
would not treat relative educational deprivation as a basis for finding a
suspect wealth classification."
The cases cited by Justice Powell, however, need not necessarily be
characterized as involving absolute deprivation of a right or a benefit. In
Griffin v. Illinois" and in Douglas v. California,6 for example, criminal
defendants were not absolutely barred from appealing a criminal
conviction. They were merely prevented from bringing a more effective
appeal - one in which the bill of particulars was accompanied by a
transcript of the trial proceedings or one presented by an attorney
rather than by the defendant.
Another argument against the Rodriguez majority's refusal to treat
district wealth as a suspect class focuses on the nature of the service
provided by the government. In indicating that previous "wealth" cases
limit the doctrine to situations in which an individual, because of his
indigency, is denied a benefit or deprived of a right, the Court sought to
distinguish personal and group wealth. It would therefore apply the
suspect class doctrine only to a case in which a poor person is denied
access to education by, for example, the imposition of a tuition fee
requirement. In opposition to this view, it is argued that in the case of
education the Court has drawn a line between group and individual
wealth that does not exist. Public education is purchased not with
personal wealth but with district wealth, the boundaries of that wealth
having been determined by the state.6 Since education is a publicly
provided service, both rich and poor residents of a low property wealth
district are poor in the only wealth with which public education can be
purchased - district property wealth.6 7
62. 411 U.S. at 24.
63. Id. at 23-24. One explanation for this position lies in the Court's view of the
disagreement among educators and social scientists as to whether there was any
relationship between per pupil expenditures and the quality of education. Id. at 42-43. If
the evidence of such a relationship were in doubt, merely showing disparities in per pupil
expenditures, as the plaintiffs had, would not be enough to trigger strict scrutiny. Id. at
54-55.
64. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
66. Michelman, supra note 46, at 50.
67. Coons, supra note 58, at 303.
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Related to this argument is one that had been made explicitly by
some members of the Court in earlier wealth discrimination cases,' is at
least implied in the opinions of others,69 and has been expressed by
several commentators. 0 It is whether governmental interference with
basic economic processes, through the use of the equal protection clause
to find an affirmative governmental duty to eliminate handicaps, such
as the lack of adequate food or shelter, that arise from differences in
individual economic circumstances,71 is wise. However, this is not a
concern relevant to education. Since education is a publicly provided
service, purchased with state-circumscribed group wealth, there is no
question of the appropriate scope of governmental intervention into the
market economy, as there might be in the case of housing, food, and
health care, which are purchased with private income. Education is
simply not a commodity the supply of which is to be determined by
market forces.
Furthermore, since public elementary and secondary education are
compulsory, the student who resides in a property-poor area and
receives lower quality educational services is closer to the indigents in
Griffin and Douglas, who were caught up in the states' criminal process,
than to the indigent who cannot afford adequate food or shelter. The
state puts the student in his situation by drawing district boundaries
and then financing education through a scheme that relies principally
on the wealth within those boundaries." In other words, the government
makes education compulsory and then provides a process for providing
education that ensures that the privileged retain their status.
A final criticism of the Rodriguez majority's treatment of the
suspect class issue is that it failed to consider whether the intermediate
68. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
69. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
70. E.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, supra
note 46.
71. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In the latter case
Justice Harlan noted:
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is more
easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it that no one would
dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a uniform sales tax, to charge
tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the purchase of water from a municipal
corporation, to impose a standard fine for criminal violations, or to establish minimum
bail for various categories of offenses.
Id. at 361-62.
72. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (where access to a judicial forum is




level of equal protection review might be applied.73 The difficulty with
the two-tiered analysis, as pointed out by Justice Marshall in his
dissent,74 is its rigidity. There is no suspect classification unless the
education is absolutely inadequate, and there is an overwhelming
correlation between personal wealth and district wealth. With the
rational basis standard the only alternative, the Court is precluded from
considering whether there are other approaches that would achieve the
state's asserted interest - the promotion of local control of education -
with less inequality.
7 5
2. The Fundamental Right Argument
The Rodriguez plaintiffs also argued that education was a fun-
damental right. Recognizing the novelty of the argument, they attemp-
ted to tie education to rights already declared fundamental, such as free
speech and voting, by contending that education was inextricably
related to those rights."6 This argument met with no success, however.
The Court saw the connection as no more compelling than the
connection between housing, food, or other subsistence needs and the
right to vote.77 It refused "to create substantive constitutional rights in
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws,"" stating that for
a right to be fundamental, it must be "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution."79 Although the right of interstate
travel, like education, is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it
nevertheless, according to the Court, is implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. Hence, a law burdening or penalizing interstate travel
would trigger strict scrutiny,8° whereas one that affected welfare,,"
73. See text accompanying notes 24 to 28 supra.
74. 411 U.S. at 98.
75. A version of the intermediate scrutiny standard, the "sliding scale" test, has been
applied in one equal educational opportunity case. Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free
School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
76. 411 U.S. at 35-36. These arguments were made successfully in Serrano v. Priest,
5 Cal. 3d 584, 604-10, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-19 (1971).
77. 411 U.S. at 37.
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id. at 33-34.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In that case the Court said,
"[t]he constitutional right to travel from one State to another . . .occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." Id. at 757. It cited Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring); Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); and Crandall v. Nevada. 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). "Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis
within the Court as to the source . . .[all have agreed that the right exists." 383 U.S. at
759. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
81. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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housing, 2 or education would not.83 Thus, differences in educational
offerings - unless wholly arbitrary - would be permitted.4
The Court also noted that the cases in which it had held the strict
scrutiny standard applicable involved legislation that infringed or
interfered with the free exercise of a fundamental right." In Rodri-
guez, by contrast, the state of Texas was not interfering with or
restricting the ability of school districts to provide education. Instead, by
allocating some state funds to school districts, rather than relying solely
on local revenues to finance education, the state was attempting to
expand, not restrict, the available educational offerings.8 6
As with its approach to the argument that wealth is a suspect
class," the Court's failure to distinguish the interest in education from
that in subsistence needs or other public services has been criticized.8
Education is widely believed to be the key to other basic needs. It is
education that will break the poverty cycle 89 and open up access to
adequate food, shelter, and other subsistence needs. An education
facilitates participation in both the political' and the economic proces-
82. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("[Tlhe Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality
83. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35.
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 37-38 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
86. 411 U.S. at 39.
87. See text accompanying notes 51 to 75 supra.
88. See, e.g., Clune, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discrimination
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289, 332; Kirp, San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez - Chaotic, Unjust - and Constitutional, 2 J.L.&
EDuc. 461 (1973); Taylor, Avoiding the "Thicket," 2 J.L. & EDUC. 482, 482-83 (1973);
Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 501 (1973).
89. For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson, when what was to become the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, including compensatory education for
the economically disadvantaged, was reported out of the Senate Education Subcommittee,
said:
With education, instead of being condemned to poverty and idleness, young
Americans can learn the skills to find a job and provide for a family ...
How many young lives have been wasted. . . because America has failed to give
all our children a chance to learn ....
[Building an adequate education system] represents a national determination
that this shall no longer be true. Poverty will no longer be a bar to learning, and
learning shall offer an escape from poverty.
President's News Conference, 1965 PUB. PAPERS 365-66 (Apr. 1, 1965).
90. Education is, to use Professor Ely's language, representation-reinforcing. Ely,
Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451 (1978).
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ses. Thus, the pervasive belief is that education not only enhances an
individual's social and economic well-being but strengthens the demo-
cratic system as well. It is for these reasons that education is publicly
provided and made compulsory by the state.91 Education can be
distinguished from other interests and can, therefore, be recognized as
fundamental without opening the door to every substantive interest.
Furthermore, with respect to the Court's view that the state was not
interfering with or burdening the exercise of a right, it has been argued
that the state had in fact sharply limited the freedom of school districts
with low property tax bases to choose to spend more for their children's
education. The state had restricted the means for increasing the amount
of revenue allocated to education to increasing the local property
tax. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent, state law imposed a
ceiling on the tax rate that a district could levy.2 Districts with very low
per pupil tax bases would therefore find it impossible to raise school
revenues comparable in amount to those raised by districts with higher
real property bases through the only mechanism permitted by the state.
Finally, as with its approach to wealth classifications, the Court can
be faulted for its rigid view toward fundamental rights. Even the right to
minimal access to a benefit, let alone equal access, is not constitutional-
ly protected unless the right is fundamental. Since education is not
categorized as fundamental, any inequality in educational offerings
would withstand challenge unless wholly arbitrary and irrational. The
Court did not slam the door totally shut, however. It suggested that
some minimal level of education might be a fundamental right. Strict
scrutiny might be triggered by the failure to provide children "with an
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the
enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political
process."93 But the Court made it clear that without a showing that
plaintiffs were absolutely deprived of sufficient education to attain the
minimal basic skills, there could not be a violation of the fourteenth
amendment, since only a rational relationship between the classification
and the state's objective need exist.H
91. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 91-92, 189 A. 131, 136-37 (1937);
M. MAYER, THE SCHOOL-S 34-40 (1961). This helps to distinguish education from sewers.
See J. CooNs, W. CLUNE III & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
414-19 (1970); Michelman, supra note 46, at 59.
92. 411 U.S. at 67.
93. Id. at 37.
94. Id. at 38-40.
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II. EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN A POST-RODRiGUEZ
WORLD: THE COURTS
A. Increasing the Number of Protected Classes or Finding Absolute
Deprivation of Education
In its five-to-four decision in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court not only
ensured that the quality of a child's education would continue to be
related to the wealth of the school district in which he resides, but also
signaled that it did not intend to treat education as a constitutional
right in itself. Rather than deterring attempts to find a basis for a
governmental obligation to provide a certain level of educational
services, this has led to a proliferation of special interest groups, seeking
to obtain judicial or legislative protection for the classes they represent.
The Rodriguez decision left open two possible approaches under the
equal protection clause. One is to define more carefully the class
involved. Unlike property-poor districts, the class must clearly be
identifiable as a "discrete and insular minority" entitled to special
judicial protection. This approach has been taken by state and lower
federal courts95 and by Congress in enacting education legislation.'
Although this route was a well traveled one before the Rodriguez
decision, the Supreme Court's refusal in Rodriguez to label education as
a fundamental interest undoubtedly made it more attractive. If
education is not a fundamental right that must be provided to all
equally, then creating new classes entitled to special protection may
have to be relied upon to trigger the duty of the government to provide a
certain level of education for each category.
This proliferation of classes causes several problems - some
political, some legal, some institutional - which are outlined below.
Beyond that, however, the expectations that are raised by lower court
cases that have extended special protection to newly created classes are
likely to be frustrated when the question comes before the Supreme
Court. The Court has held only race, national origin, and alienage (and
the latter only under certain circumstances) to be suspect" and has
treated gender and illegitimacy as intermediate categories. 8 It is
unlikely to add to the number of classes entitled to special judicial
protection.
95. See note 154 and accompanying text infra.
96. See text accompanying note 203 infra.
97. See text accompanying notes 19 to 21 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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The issue is further complicated by plaintiff groups who contend
that "equal" treatment means more than equal services and other
resources, that "equal" means whatever is necessary to put them on a
par with the average child.9 Both Congress and some lower courts,
responding to these groups, have adopted the position that in certain
circumstances there is an affirmative governmental duty to remove
barriers not of the government's making. When federal courts treat the
removal of language or other handicapping barriers to learning as an
affirmative constitutional duty - or the failure to do so as a
constitutional violation - significant questions about the
appropriateness of the role of federal courts are raised, since often the
remedy involves a major reallocation of resources and educational
priorities within a state or school district. And when Congress directs
states to undertake these affirmative remedies, questions of federalism
are raised.
The other approach to finding a state's constitutional obligation to
ensure equal educational opportunity, largely confined to the courts, is to
focus on the suggestion in Rodriguez that some minimal level of
education might be a fundamental right. In this case, the classifications
need not be suspect in themselves; it is their relationship to the
fundamental or important right that triggers the equal protection claim.
This in a sense is a return to the language in Brown v. Board of
Education that education is so important that if the state provides it, it
must be provided equally.1°°
In some cases, it has been argued that with certain classes, the
failure of the government affirmatively to provide them with extra
resources or special treatment amounts to the functional equivalent of
an absolute deprivation of education. In such cases, the argument goes,
even though education is offered on an equal basis, the class in question,
99. See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.
100. In Brown the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a
right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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because of barriers not of the government's creation, is unable to take
advantage of the education offered.
When the claim to a certain level of education is grounded solely in
the Constitution, rather than in a statute, the courts have been
relatively cautious about creating new classifications that are to be
treated as suspect or finding that the state has deprived a class of even a
minimal level of education. In some areas, however, courts have been
more willing to find that the equal protection clause has been violated.
A few illustrations are given of the various approaches courts have
taken.
B. Equal Educational Opportunity: Different Strokes for Different
Folks
1. Racial Minorities
The initial concern in the area of racial discrimination in education,
the area of law most fully developed by the Supreme Court in the
absence of a statute, was to end the massive racial insult blacks had
received at the hands of the state. The state, through compelled
segregation, had stigmatized racial and ethnic groups. State-imposed
isolation was a constitutional violation and the affirmative obligation of
ending that isolation fell upon the government. After Green v. County
School Board'01 was decided in 1968, the affirmative obligation took the
form of a duty to "take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch.' 0 2
Recently, in the second phase of the Detroit desegregation case,
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken JJ),10 3 the Supreme Court held £hat the duty
requires not merely pupil reassignment, but also compensatory or
remedial reading programs, guidance and counseling programs, and
teacher and administrator retraining, to the extent that these additional
and compensatory educational services are necessary to restore the
victim of discrimination to the educational position in which he would
have been but for the unconstitutional conduct of school officials." This
suggests that equal educational opportunity means more than equal
education provided in a nonsegregated setting. Extra educational
services are to be provided to minority children who have been
101. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
102. Id. at 437-38.
103. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
104. See id. at 274-75, 280, 287.
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attending racially isolated schools."5 The difficult problem is how a
court can determine where the victim would have been but for
government-imposed or -encouraged racial or ethnic isolation and what
kinds of educational services and what quantity will restore him to that
position. In view of our limited knowledge of the conditions associated
with racial and cultural isolation and of what programs would correct
those conditions, one wonders why the Supreme Court believes lower
courts can readily discern and order the appropriate programs. The
Court in Rodriguez certainly seemed skeptical, noting that the case:
involve[d] the most persistent and difficult questions of educational
policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference
... .Education . . .presents a myriad of "intractable economic,
social and even philosophical problems. . . ." On even the most
basic questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are
divided."'0
It is hard to believe that the remedial horrors conjured up by the
Supreme Court in Rodriguez are any greater than would be encountered
in determining the effects of segregation and the kinds of programs that
would best ameliorate its effects.
This difference between Rodriguez and Milliken H certainly cannot
be explained by changes in the quality of social science evidence. Social
science research is no better here than it was on the issues in Rodriguez.
And the difference between Rodriguez and Milliken II certainly does not
lie in a changing faith in the ability of federal courts to decide issues of
educational policy. Why then in Milliken II does the Court find that the
Constitution affirmatively requires the state to provide more than equal
treatment where minority children are involved? One possible explana-
tion is that Milliken H involved a suspect class whereas Rodriguez did
not, but a closer analysis of the case suggests that the difference
between the scope of the remedy in the two cases lies in the source of the
wrong. Milliken II is really not a very great leap from the traditional
equal protection approach, even though courts are likely to be involved
in ordering the reallocation of significant resources and educational
105. Although the Supreme Court had not previously addressed the question whether
federal courts could order compensatory education programs as part of a school
desegregation remedy, many lower courts had long required the inclusion of such
programs in desegregation plans. See cases cited id. at 983-86.
106. 411 U.S. at 42 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
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priorities. Before federal courts can devise and order new educational
programming, they must find that racial isolation was the result of
deliberate acts of discrimination by school authorities. The net result is
that, in the area of race, the principal governmental duty is still to
remove a state-imposed barrier. Therein lies the justification for the
Milliken II Court's foray into the field of educational policy. Racial
minorities, it seems, have an affirmative constitutional right to compen-
satory education, but not in the absence of some initial unconstitutional
conduct by the government.107
2. Gender Discrimination
Similarly, in the area of gender classification in education, there
has been no major involvement of the courts in anything more than
removing government-imposed barriers. Even then courts have certain-
ly not yet intervened to the extent of requiring significant reallocation
of resources or restructuring of institutions, as in Milliken I.
The Supreme Court held in Craig v. Boren"°s that a gender
classification is not suspect, but is sufficiently tainted to require that it
be substantially related to an important governmental interest. °9 It
remains to be seen how this intermediate standard of review will work
when confronted with something less than total deprivation of a benefit.
The only constitutional violations found by lower courts to date have
involved total exclusion from schools or educational programs and
activities on the basis of gender. The remedy for such a violation is
admission - not unlike the pre-Brown cases such as Sweatt v. Painter."°
For example, lower courts have found unconstitutional the denial of
access to academically elite schools"' and the use of differential
admission standards that give preference to less qualified males."2
Several state and lower federal courts have also indicated that the
complete exclusion of female students from certain sports - generally
107. But cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 515 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (where, because of density of residential
segregation or for other reasons, black children were denied integrated education, school
system must provide compensatory education "sufficient at least to overcome the
detriment of segregation and thus provide, as nearly as possible, equal educational
opportunity to all schoolchildren.").
108. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
109. Id. at 197. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979).
110. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
111. See, e.g., Kirstein v. University of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
112. See, e.g., Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.
1974); Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972).
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non-contact sports - is a denial of equal protection 1 3 and have ordered
their inclusion.
It is unlikely that in the area of sex, in contrast to race, even
separate schools and programs will be found unconstitutional as long as
they are equal. When this issue was presented to the Supreme Court in
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,"' the result was an
equally divided Court, leaving standing a Third Circuit decision
upholding separate girls' and boys' academically elite public high
schools." 5 The defendant school board had argued that sex-segregated
high schools are a "time honored educational alternative, "'.6 and had
presented some social science evidence supporting the view that a
single-sex school - especially for adolescents - is more conducive to
learning than a coeducational school."7 Moreover, women were not
deprived of educational opportunities since there was a comparable
academic facility for women."8 Whether after Craig v. Boren,"' this
would be a sufficient justification for the intermediate test, which
requires a substantial relation to an important governmental interest, is
113. E.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973)
(tennis, skiing, running); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1974) (cross-country). While most cases grounded in the equal
protection clause have indicated that contact sports might be treated differently, some
state courts, applying their state constitution's equal rights amendment, have held that
qualified girls cannot be excluded even from contact sports. E.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85
Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (football). Other courts have utilized the rational basis
standard of equal protection review and upheld the exclusion even in the case of
non-contact sports. E.g., Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
114. 430 U.S. 703 (1977), affg by an equally divided Court, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
115. In 1970 a similar case arose at the university level, where the issue was raised by
male plaintiffs. The three-judge district court held that a state statute that limited
admission to one of its eight colleges to females on the theory that the curricula were
especially helpful to female vis-a-vis male students was not without a rational
justification, and therefore did not deny equal protection. Williams v. McNair, 316 F.
Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970). The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision. 401 U.S.
951 (1971).
116. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 882 (3d Cir. 1976).
117. The "social science evidence" was rather weak. The study introduced to support
the schoolboard's position was based on a questionnaire administered to juniors and
seniors in New Zealand attending both sex-segregated and coeducational high schools.
Male and female students were asked how much time they devoted to homework, how they
would use an extra hour at school, and whether they would prefer to be remembered at
school as a leader, a brilliant student, or a popular person. Males and females in
coeducational institutions studied less, would use the extra hour for study less frequently,
and were concerned with popularity more frequently than students who attended
sex-segregated facilities. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 330-31 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
118. 532 F.2d at 882-83.
119. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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not certain.120 The decisions to date, however, indicate that it remains
constitutional to have government-imposed separation based on gender.
Even when courts have found that the exclusion of women from
certain educational programs is attributable to intentional acts of
discrimination by school officials, no court has required special remedial
education in, for example, math and science, industrial arts, or physical
fitness. Thus, there is no gender counterpart of Milliken I. This
undoubtedly reflects the view that the constitutional harm is the
unequal treatment of an individual - e.g., denying access to a
particular educational program on the basis of the individual's gender.
Equal treatment, in the form of access to the program, eliminates the
harm. An alternative view consistent with the treatment of race is that
women, as a group, have been restricted in their access to the political
process - by government, by society, or what have you - and therefore
are in need of special judicial protection. Under this perception of the
constitutional harm, women as a group might be constitutionally
entitled to special affirmative assistance.' The courts, however, by and
large have not taken this view.
3. Language Minorities
The question whether ethnic minorities are constitutionally pro-
tected from discriminatory treatment - defined as the invidious
separation from the majority or denial by the government of a benefit
that is provided all other children - is no longer in doubt. 2' In question
now is whether the Constitution obligates governmental authorities to
treat members of ethnic minority groups with limited English language
abilities differently than other students are treated. In other words, is
there an affirmative duty to provide them with special programs to
offset their language handicap when it is a barrier to their educational
progress, even though the barrier is not one invidiously created by the
government?
120. See id. at 197-99.
121. There are several decisions that suggest that it may not be unconstitutional to
provide special compensatory programs for women. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 451
(1974). But cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(medical school admissions policy including a minority quota violated majority applicant's
right to equal protection).
122. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954); Tasby v. Estes, 342 F.
Supp. 945, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1971), affd in part, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
939 (1975); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex.
1970), affd in part, 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
1979]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Ninth Circuit, in Lau v. Nichols,2' was presented with the
argument that even though a student is given the same course of
instruction as all other schoolchildren, "he is denied education on 'equal
terms' with them if he cannot understand the language of instruction.
) 24 The plaintiffs' position was that Brown v. Board of Education
require[d] schools to provide 'equal' opportunities to all, and
equality is to be measured not only by what the school offers the
child, but by the potential which the child brings to the school. If
the student is disadvantaged with respect to his classmates, the
school has an affirmative duty to provide him special assistance to
overcome his disabilities, whatever the origin of those disabilities
may be. 1
5
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. The use of English as the sole
language of instruction did not evidence the requisite affirmative
governmental discrimination against persons because of their race or
ethnic origin, nor was there any evidence that the plaintiffs' language
deficiencies were related to any past discriminatory action by the
state.
2 6
The Supreme Court reversed, although it avoided the constitutional
issue.Yn The majority relied solely on section 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964" and guidelines promulgated under it requiring
school districts that receive federal funds to provide assistance to
students with English language deficiencies."2 Although the case thus
became one of statutory construction rather than constitutional inter-
pretation, the Court did recognize that "there is no equality of treatment
merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks,
teachers and curriculum; for students who do not understand English
123. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd in part, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
124. Id. at 794.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 796-97, 799. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (compensatory
education programs may be ordered by federal courts for victims of past de jure
segregation).
127. 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."
129. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970). These guidelines' interpretation of what Title VI
required where language stood in the way of equal educational opportunity was enacted
into law in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204(f),
88 Stat. 515 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976)).
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are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education."3 This
certainly sounds like an argument based on constructive exclusion from
education. When coupled with the suggestion of the Rodriguez Court
that some minimal quantum of education may be a fundamental right,
the way has been opened to the argument that the failure to provide
children of limited English language ability with special assistance to
overcome their "linguistic handicaps" absolutely deprives them of that
quantum of education that may be a "constitutionally protected
prerequisite" to the "meaningful exercise" of the right to speak and to
vote.131
Even if this argument were successful, other questions remain
unresolved. Is the constitutional entitlement to an equal educational
opportunity that of an individual child of limited English language
ability or that of a defined ethnic or language-minority group?132 Is every
language minority group constitutionally entitled to affirmative assist-
ance or only groups that historically have been stigmatized and
invidiously discriminated against?13
The Supreme Court did not reach the constitutional question in Lau
v. Nichols. Whether students with English-language deficiencies who
cannot communicate in the classroom are constructively excluded from
an education to the point that a constitutionally protected interest is
violated has thus not been clarified. In several lower court cases
plaintiffs raising constitutional issues similar to those in Lau have been
unsuccessful in the absence of proof of past governmental discrimina-
tion."3
130. 414 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added).
131. 411 U.S. at 36.
132. Although the majority opinion in Lau v. Nichols did not comment on whether
§ 601 would apply to a smaller number of students than the 1,800 non-English-speaking
Chinese students involved in that case, Justice Blackmun emphasized that he concurred
solely because of the size of the affected group.
I merely wish to make plain that when, in another case, we are concerned with a very
few youngsters, or with just a single child who speaks only German or Polish or
Spanish or any language other than English, I would not regard today's decision, or
the separate concurrence, as conclusive upon the issue whether the statute and the
guidelines require the funded school district to provide special instruction. For me,
numbers are at the heart of this case and my concurrence is to be understood
accordingly.
414 U.S. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
133. For example, are Hungarian or Italian children of limited English-speaking
ability entitled to special assistance, or are only such groups as the Mexican-Americans in
the Southwest or the Chinese and Japanese in California, historically subjected to
government as well as private discrimination, entitled to special language assistance?
134. E.g., Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977). In Guadalupe Org'n, Inc.
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It is only in the context of desegregation litigation that a remedy to
provide extra education to correct English language deficiencies has
been constitutionally imposed on school authorities,'35 but such circum-
stances parallel those in Milliken II, in that there had been a prior
finding of deliberate discrimination by the state.3 6 Thus, the existing
case law suggests that while ethnic and national origin minorities are
clearly suspect classifications triggering strict judicial scrutiny, before
the equal protection clause requires an affirmative remedy there must
be a showing that the government has deliberately singled out the class
for differential discriminatory treatment.
4. Handicapped Students
a. Total Exclusion
Handicapped students clearly should be able to draw upon the
Supreme Court's definition of a suspect class in Rodriguez. They are
saddled with "disabilities" that are largely immutable and determined
solely by accident of birth or disease. 37 There is a long history of
discriminatory treatment of handicapped persons at the hands of state
legislatures, ranging from involuntary sterilization3 8 to prohibitions on
v. Tempe Elem. School Dist. No. 3, 587 F,2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978), the court held that the
school district was not constitutionally required to provide bilingual-bicultural programs
to Mexican American and Yaqui Indian children. In the absence of intentional
discrimination, the decision to provide only remedial language assistance and not
bilingual-bicultural education met the rational basis test of Rodriguez. Id. at 1026-27.
According to the court, the legitimate state interest to which this program bore a rational
relationship was, in effect, the preservation of cultural homogeneity. Id.at 1027, The
decision implies, however, that there may be a constitutional duty to provide some
assistance (even if only remedial English) to limited English-speaking children.
135. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), affd in
part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); Arvizu v. Waco Ind.
School Dist., 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex. 1973), affd in part, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), affd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th
Cir. 1972). But see Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), affd
on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
136. See 433 U.S. 267, 269 (1977).
137. 411 U.S. at 28. It should be noted, however, that Justice Brennan, in his plurality
opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), distinguished sex, like race and
national origin, "from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability,"
noting that the sex characteristic, like other suspect criteria, "frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society." Id. at 686. Presumably, then, mental
retardation does bear some relation to ability to perform.
138. In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of a Virginia statute that permitted the sterilization of institutionalized patients
"afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility, etc." Id. at 206. By the late 1950's,
28 states had some form of sterilization statute; 17 of these laws included epileptics as well
as the mentally ill and mentally retarded. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal
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marriage 139 and on more mundane rights such as the right of contract 40
and to obtain licenses of various kinds."' Most importantly, many
handicapped children have long been excluded from any public school-
ing." Finally, since in many cases handicapped persons have been
denied the right to vote,"3 they are clearly "relegated to . . . a position
of political powerlessness."'" Thus, it could be - and has been - argued
that the handicapped are a suspect class entitled to "extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian process.""5
The first major legal breakthrough for education for handicapped
students came in a pre-Rodriguez case, Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania.'" Under state law, retarded
Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 861 (1975). By 1971 at least as many
states still had their statutes on the books, though in most they were seldom used. See
generally AMERICAN BAR FouN ATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 207-25 (rev.
ed. 1971).
139. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STATS. § 402.020(1) (1970); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48-104,
-105 (1947) (repealed by Ch. 536, § 45, 1975 Mont. Laws 1533).
140. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-170 (1975); COLO. REV. STATS. § 27-9-119 (1973)
(repealed by Ch. 227, § 1, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 819, as amended by Ch. 67, § 1, 1974 Colo.
Sess. Laws 287); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-206 (1977).
141. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12805(c), (d) (West 1975 & Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 49-7-19 (1972) (hunting and fishing licenses); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.08(B),
(C) (Page Supp. 1978) (driver's licenses).
142. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265
(1958). There the court stated:
While this constitutional guarantee [that "the general assembly shall provide a
thorough and efficient system of free schools," ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1] applies to all
children in the State, it cannot assure that all children are educable. The term
"common school education" implies the capacity, as well as the right, to receive the
common training, otherwise the educational process cannot function. . . . Existing
legislation does not require the State to provide a free educational program, as a part
of the common school system, for the feeble minded or mentally deficient children
who, because of limited intelligence, are unable to receive a good common school
education. Under the circumstances, this constitutional mandate has no application.
Id. at 213, 154 N.E.2d at 270.
Handicapped students in many states had been specifically exempted from
compulsory school attendance laws. See, e.g., Ch. 339, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws. 289
(repealed by Ch. 678, § 2, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 889). Moreover, if the child were unlikely
to "profit by instruction given in the public schools," he was to be excluded and parents
who persisted in seeking the attendance of such children were guilty of a misdemeanor.
Ch. 1372, art. 19, § 5, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1599-600 (repealed by Ch. 678, § 1, 1975 N.C.
Sess. Laws 889). See also ALA. CODE § 16-28-6(a)(1) (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 13-1375 (Purdon 1962, Supp. 1979).
143. See, e.g., Ky. CoNsr. § 145(3); NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 16, § 10
(1972).
144. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
145. Id. See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 138.
146. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent decree).
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children could be excluded from the public schools if they had been
certified as "uneducable and untrainable" or had not attained the
mental age of a normal five-year-old child."7 The plaintiffs introduced
evidence that all mentally retarded persons are capable of benefitting
from a program of education and training. " Without deciding whether
mentally handicapped children were a suspect class or education was a
fundamental right, the court concluded that the policy of providing
education to normal children while denying it entirely to a substantial
number of children with mental handicaps "established a colorable
constitutional claim even under the less stringent rational basis test."" 9
The parties entered into a consent agreement whereby the state
recognized its "obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free,
public program of education and training appropriate to the child's
capacity . . . ."I' In Mills v. Board of Education,"' another pre-
Rodriguez case dealing with the mentally retarded and emotionally
disturbed, the district court held that the District of Columbia school
board, in denying such students an education, violated statutory policy
embodied in the District of Columbia Code'52 as well as the due process
clause of the Constitution."3 In neither of these cases was the question
whether the handicapped were a suspect class clearly dealt with.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, only one court,
the North Dakota Supreme Court, has unequivocally found the hand-
icapped to be a suspect class."4 However, even if the courts are unlikely
to consider handicapped students a suspect class, most courts, presented
with the kind of evidence of the ability of even severely mentally
147. Id. at 282.
148. Id. at 296.
149. Id. at 283 n.8.
150. Id. at 307.
151. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
152. Id. at 873-74. The court quoted § 31-203, which provided:
The Board of Education . . . may issue a certificate excusing from attendance at
school a child who, upon examination ordered by such board, is found to be unable
mentally or physically to profit from attendance at school: Provided, however, that if
such examination shows that such child may benefit from specialized instruction
adapted to his needs, he shall attend upon such instruction.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-203 (1971) (current version identical). Thus, the Mills decision has
somewhat limited precedential value in establishing a constitutional right.
153. 348 F. Supp. at 875. The court found that the District's denial of a right that it
provided to other children was without a rational basis. Id.
154. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974). See Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F.
Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum). Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 138; Note, The Right of




retarded children to learn introduced by the plaintiffs in the PARC
case, 55 will probably find that the exclusion of handicapped children
from any education whatsoever is arbitrary and irrational and hence
unconstitutional even under the less stringent equal protection stan-
dard.
The "fundamental right" strand of the Rodriguez opinion suggests
another approach for handicapped students. The Rodriguez majority
distinguished the interdistrict financing inequities in Texas, which
produced relative differences in the quality of education, from a state
"financing system [that] occasioned an absolute denial of educational
opportunities to any of its children."'" It could be argued that completely
excluding a class of children such as the mentally retarded from the
public schools would violate the equal protection clause.'57 A handi-
capped child, who is entirely deprived of an educational opportunity, is
arguably distinguishable from the student in Rodriguez who is
receiving an "adequate" but relatively inferior education.
In one post-Rodriguez case, Cuyahoga County Association for
Retarded Children and Adults v. Essex,' a statute nearly identical to
that deemed unconstitutional in PARC was upheld under the more
lenient rational basis standard of equal protection, the district court
expressly relying on the Rodriguez holding that education is not a
constitutionally guaranteed right.5 Other cases have found the exclu-
sion of handicapped children unconstitutional, often without clearly
articulating the standard of equal protection review applied. 60
155. 343 F. Supp. at 296. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
156. 411 U.S. at 37.
157. The North Dakota Supreme Court recently stated with regard to the handicapped
that "[flederal constitutional questions would arise if there were a total deprivation of
educational opportunities. ... In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D. 1974).
158. 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
159. Id. at 50.
160. There are several pre-Rodriguez cases, e.g., In re Apple, 73 Misc. 2d 553, 342
N.Y.S.2d 352 (Queens County Fam. Ct. 1973); In re Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340
N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. County Fam. Ct. 1973); as well as cases decided after Rodriguez, e.g.,
North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, Civil No. 3050 (E.D.N.C.,
filed July 31, 1978) (unreported consent agreement); Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp.
320 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(Rodriguez left open possibility that denial of minimally adequate education might
infringe upon a fundamental interest); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 958 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) ("not inconsistent with Rodriguez to hold that there exists a constitutional right
to a certain minimum level of education as opposed to a constitutional right to a particular
level of education"); LeBanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973) (consent decree);
Maryland Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Maryland, No. 100-182-77676 (Baltimore
County Cir. Ct., filed Apr. 6, 1974) (cited in Alschuler, Education for the Handicapped, 7
J.L. & EDUC. 523, 523 n.2, 526 (1978)); In re Lofft, 86 Misc. 2d 431, 383 N.Y.S.2d 142
(Cayuga County Fain. Ct. 1976); In re Jessup, 85 Misc. 2d 575,580, 379 N.Y.S.2d 626, 632
(N.Y. County Fain. Ct. 1975) (when state undertakes to provide education, it must
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b. Special Treatment and Appropriate Education
Although most courts might have little difficulty finding the total
exclusion of handicapped children from public schooling to be a violation
of the equal protection clause, a more difficult question is whether the
equal protection clause is violated by a state's failure to provide the
handicapped with an "appropriate" education. Even if handicapped
children are not excluded from public schools, is the state under a
constitutional obligation to provide a certain amount and kind of
education to such children? A few of the pre-Rodriguez cases, in
particular PARC and Mills, required school officials to place each child
in a program "appropriate to the child's capacity."' 6 ' Such requirements,
as the Mills case makes clear, involve the reallocation of substantial
resources."2 Because PARC was a consent decree and Mills grounded
the school board's obligation in existing statutes and regulations, "" the
question remains whether, under the equal protection clause, courts can
order school systems to undertake this burden.'6
recognize student's entitlement to education as property right protected by fourteenth
amendment's due process clause); In re K., 74 Misc. 2d 872, 347 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Kings
County Fam. Ct. 1973); In re Kirschner, 74 Misc. 2d 20, 344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Monroe County
Fain. Ct. 1973); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D. 1974) ("Federal constitutional
questions would arise if there were a total deprivation of educational opportunities . . .").
It should be noted that the Cuyahoga County case was decided on the pleadings.
The court reviewed only the facial constitutionality of the state statutes excluding children
who have been "determined to be incapable of profiting substantially by further
instruction . . . ." 411 F. Supp. at 51. The court was not presented with the kind of
evidence introduced in PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 296.
161. The consent agreement in PARC provided that the state would undertake to
"place each mentally retarded child in a free, public program of education and training
appropriate to the child's capacity .... " 343 F. Supp. at 307. In Mills, the court ordered
the District of Columbia Board of Education to "provide to each child of school age a free
and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the degree of the child's mental,
physical or emotional disability or impairment." 348 F. Supp. at 878. The court appeared
to base this obligation to provide a "suitable" education on requirements in the statutes
and regulations of the District of Columbia rather than on the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. See id. at 874.
162. In Mills, the defendants had argued that it was impossible to afford plaintiffs the
requesteli relief unless they diverted funds already appropriated for other services, thereby
violating a congressional act. 348 F. Supp. at 875. The court rejected the argument, stating
that the District's "interest in educating the excluded children clearly must outweigh its
interest in preserving its financial resources." Id. at 876. The inadequacies of the school
system could not "be permitted to bear more heavily on the 'exceptional' or handicapped
child than on the normal child." Id.
163. See note 161 supra.
164. See Levinson, The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education for Learning
Disabled Children, 12 VA1.. L. REV. 253 (1978).
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The Supreme Court decision in Lau v. Nichols6 ' provides some
support for a right to an appropriate education. That case involved
non-English-speaking Chinese students who were compelled to sit in
classrooms in which the only language spoken was English. Although
the Court did not decide the constitutional issue, it did recognize, as
noted earlier, that "there is no equality of treatment merely by
providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and
curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively
foreclosed from any meaningful education."'66 An argument could be
made that handicapped children who do not receive an education
appropriate to their needs may similarly be foreclosed from "any
meaningful education" and thus deprived of that minimum quantum of
education that may be a fundamental right.16 7
Several lower federal and state courts have held that handicapped
students are constitutionally entitled to an appropriate education. For
example, in Fialkowski v. Shapp66 two multiply-handicapped brothers,
with mental ages of less than two - although their chronological ages
were twelve and twenty-one - alleged that their equal protection and
due process rights were violated because school officials failed to offer
them training appropriate to their learning capacities. They sought to
have the school they attended teach them how to dress, eat, and walk
rather than to read or write, 9 arguing that because of the nature of
their handicaps, they did not benefit from the education they received.
The district court noted that Rodriguez did not foreclose their claim: 7 '
unlike the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, the plaintiffs in Fialkowski were
seeking equal access to some minimally adequate level of education."'
An educational program, the court said, must be evaluated in terms of
its capacity to equip a child with the tools needed in life. 7 ' Placing
children with the mental abilities of two-year-olds in a program
emphasizing reading and writing skills was inadequate to equip them
with such tools. 73
165. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
166. Id. at 566. See text accompanying notes 123 to 136 supra.
167. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
168. 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
169. Id. at 948 n.1.
170. Id. at 957. Since the court was ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the court's
discussion of this and succeeding points is largely dictum.
171. Id. at 958.
172. Id. at 959.
173. Id. Cf. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295, cert. denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973) (state constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient system of
education" interpreted as embracing "that educational opportunity which is needed in the
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Several other cases have also held that the education to which
handicapped children are constitutionally entitled is a "meaningful
education" or an "education commensurate with their needs.1 7 4 And a
number of cases have held that if the public school system does not have
suitable facilities, an appropriate education must be provided in private
facilities at public expense.',
The post-Rodriguez "appropriate education" cases have, however,
not yielded completely consistent views. In one case, residents of a New
York institution for the mentally retarded alleged they had not been
provided an adequate public education, one suited to their needs and
capabilities.'7 , The district court, citing Rodriguez, declared that "if
there is no constitutional infirmity in a system in which the state
permits children of normal mental ability to receive a varying quality of
education, a state is not constitutionally required to provide the
mentally retarded with a certain level of special education." '77 The court,
viewing the rational basis test as the appropriate standard of equal
protection review, found that the state had allocated scarce resources
among conflicting needs in a rational manner, so that there was no
constitutional violation in denying an appropriate education to the
mentally retarded."'
contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the
labor market.").
A similar case involved children with "specific learning disabilities," who claimed
that they were "deprived of an education appropriate to their specialized needs," although
they were afforded access to the same curriculum as normal children. Frederick L. v.
Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 833-34 (E.D. Pa. 1976). They contended that they could not
derive any educational benefit from the normal curriculum without special instruction
aimed at their learning handicaps. Thus, they were "constructively excluded from public
educational services, because - for them - the instruction offered is virtually useless, if
not positively harmful." Id. at 835. The court said that since Rodriguez "left open the
possibility that the denial of a minimally adequate educational opportunity may trench
upon a fundamental interest," the plaintiffs might be entitled to the strict scrutiny
standard of review "because a classification has functionally excluded them from a
minimally adequate education." Id. It did not reach the constitutional question when it
came to the merits because state statutory grounds proved dispositive of the claim.
Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.
1977).
174. E.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Wisc. 1977); cf. LeBanks v.
Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 140 (E.D. La. 1973) (consent agreement).
175. See, e.g., In re Loft, 86 Misc. 2d 431, 383 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Cayuga County Fain. Ct.
1976); In re Kirschner, 74 Misc. 2d 20, 344 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Monroe County Fam. Ct. 1973);
In Re Apple, 73 Misc. 2d 553, 342 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Queens County Fain. Ct. 1973); In Re
Downey, 72 Misc. 2d 772, 340 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. County Fam. Ct. 1973). But see Doe v.
Laconia Supervisory Union No. 30, 396 F. Supp. 1291 (D.N.H. 1975).
176. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
177. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 763-64.
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Similarly, in Sherer v. Waier, ' public school officials had refused to
enroll a child who had spina bifida, which required catheterization at
least once a day during school hours, offering instead to provide
homebound instruction. The district court held that this was not a
denial of equal protection."s Citing Rodriguez as the basis for determin-
ing that education is not a fundamental right,18 ' the court held that the
defendants had not denied the child an education but had merely
refused to provide special services not provided to other students."2 The
Constitution does not place "an affirmative duty on the defendants to
provide special services for a special class."'' 8
Although most cases seem to have drawn on the Rodriguez Court's
speculation that the denial of some minimal level of education might be
a constitutional violation, the right to an "appropriate" education for
handicapped students might also be drawn from the "right to treatment"
cases. The cases have held that the restraint of liberty resulting from
civil commitment in order to receive treatment is a violation of the
fourteenth amendment's due process or equal protection clause where no
treatment is provided.'8 This concept has been extended to training
schools for juveniles adjudged "in need of supervision.""85 Recently, a
district court in New York expanded this concept in applying it to a
special day school on the ground that, although students are not
confined or deprived of their liberty to the extent of plaintiffs in mental
institutions or training schools, the schools are a "restrictive" environ-
ment and placement is not entirely voluntary.8 ' Thus, the failure to
provide "appropriate educational and therapeutic treatment" was a
violation of their constitutional rights.87 The concept could be carried
one step further to apply to all handicapped students. Schooling is
compulsory, there is little choice on the part of handicapped students in
their assignment to particular classes, and all schools provide to some
extent a "restrictive" environment.
An analysis of the decisions holding that school districts are
constitutionally required to provide handicapped students with an
179. 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
180. Id. at 1047-48.
181. Id. at 1047.
182. Id. at 1048.
183. Id.
184. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
185. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
186. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1275 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
187. Id. at 1274.
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ttappropriate" education indicates that in general courts rarely articu-
late a specific definition of "appropriate." Often the courts have turned
to existing state legislation or regulations to determine what is an
appropriate education." The ability to "equip a child with the tools
needed in life"'89 seems to be as specific as the courts have gotten. It is
unclear whether the constitutionally protected right of a handicapped
child to an equal educational opportunity means that there is a
constitutional obligation to educate each individual handicapped child to
his maximum potential or merely to provide such children with minimal
"survival" skills. The courts that have found no constitutional right to
an "appropriate" education have of course considered that equal
educational opportunity means merely to make some education avail-
able to such children. There is no affirmative duty to provide special
assistance to overcome the barriers created by their physical and mental
disabilities.
In sum, whether there is a constitutional, as opposed to the
statutory, right of handicapped students to an "appropriate" education
commensurate with their "needs" is questionable. The Supreme Court
has yet to hear a case involving either the exclusion of handicapped
children from all education or the failure to provide an "appropriate"
education to such children. Some lower courts have indicated that there
is no right to an appropriate education, and other courts, having found
such a right, have failed to provide any judicially manageable standards
for determining when that right has been met.
5. Wealth Discrimination
Courts would probably apply the strict scrutiny standard of equal
protection review to legislation that acted to deny low-income persons
any education at all. For example, tuition fees for admission to public
schools that totally barred indigent students would meet the "absolute
deprivation" test of Rodriguez." The more difficult question arises
188. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 419 F. Supp. 960, 978-79 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd,
557 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1977).
189. Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("An educational
program must be assessed in terms of its capacity to equip a child with the tools needed in
life.").
190.
If elementary and secondary education were made available by the State only to those
able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, there would be a clearly defined class
of "poor" people - definable in terms of their ability to pay the prescribed sum - who
would be absolutely precluded from receiving an education. That case would present a
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where there are relative differences in the amount of money expended
for education and the differences are systematically related to the
wealth of individual children and their families.
The existence of a systematic pattern of disparities in per pupil
expenditures on a school-by-school basis within a single school district,
where low expenditures are found in schools serving low-income
neighborhoods, arguably could be distinguished from the situation in
Rodriguez. That case involved disparities in expenditures between
school districts; here the wealth classification postulated is not district
wealth but personal wealth. Thus the system discriminates against a
definable group of poor people and may therefore create a "suspect
classification," triggering the stricter equal protection standard."'
Even if the weaker standard is utilized, however, it could be argued
that there is no rational basis for a system that maintains disparities in
educational expenditures among schools within a single district. In
Rodriguez the Court found that encouraging local autonomy by
permitting districts to decide how much to tax themselves for education
was a legitimate state purpose, even if the result were substantial
disparities among districts in per pupil expenditures. Discrimination
among schools within a single district could not serve such a purpose,
since it is the central school board, not the individual school, that
decides how much is to be spent in each school.
In Hobson v. Hansen,9 decided before the Rodriguez decision was
handed down, substantial differences in the per-pupil expenditures for
teachers' salaries and benefits were found to exist between schools
attended by the wealthier, predominantly white students in Washing-
ton, D. C. and schools in the low-income, minority sections of the city.
Since the school board was unable to advance a compelling state interest
justifying this unequal treatment, the court found it violated the equal
protection clause, and ordered per-pupil expenditures for teachers from
far more compelling set of circumstances for judicial assistance than the case before us
today.
411 U.S. at 25 n. 60. Accord, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1964) (state could
not constitutionally "reduce expenditures for education by barring indigent children from
its schools").
191. But see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 22-25. The
Rodriguez Court suggested that in order to fit within traditional equal protection notions a
class of poor persons would have to be "fairly" defined as indigent or composed of persons
whose incomes are beneath some designated poverty level. Many students who attend
schools in ghetto areas would be likely to meet either of these criteria. Nevertheless, it is
not clear whether the Court would also require a showing that there has been an absolute
deprivation of education and not just provision of a poorer quality education.
192. 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
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the regular budget to be equalized within five percent in all the
District's elementary schools. 93 Although the case predated Rodriguez,
it is likely that the Hobson plaintiffs would have prevailed even after
that decision, because Hobson's holding rests on discrimination on the
basis of race - an indisputably suspect classification - as well as on
wealth.
The only significant post-Rodriguez case involving intradistrict
disparities in school expenditures is Brown v. Board of Education of
Chicago.94 The plaintiffs contended that the Chicago school board
allocated school funds in a manner that discriminated against non-white
and poor children. Declining to distinguish Rodriguez, the court applied
the weaker, rational relationship test and held that the funding
disparities were not irrational. They were due to the concentration of
higher salaried teachers in certain schools. 95 The city's voluntary
teacher transfer policy, which enabled more experienced teachers to
transfer to more "desirable" schools, was endorsed by the court even
though it was the primary cause of the funding disparity, since it
ttpresumably helps keep these teachers in the Chicago school system,
which upgrades the skill level of the system as a whole."'" Because the
plaintiffs made no showing that they constituted a definable category of
poor persons,'97 and because they were not absolutely deprived of
education, the court held that the school-by-school disparities in
expenditures did not produce any unconstitutional economic discrimina-
tion.' 98 Thus, even when the element of district wealth has been
removed, and the classification is closer to personal wealth, it is
unlikely that courts will deem it appropriate to apply the stricter
standard of equal protection review.
193. Id. at 863-64.
194. 386 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
195. Id. at 118-19. In many school districts, higher paid senior teachers are assigned
to middle class schools, while probationary teachers, at the bottom of the salary scale, are
assigned to inner city schools. See id. at 119; Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 854-56
(D.D.C. 1971); In re Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 338-44, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852, 866-71 (N.Y.
County Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958); B. LEVIN, supra note 60, at 296.
196. 386 F. Supp. at 123.
197. See note 191 supra. The Brown court saw no distinction between the class in
Rodriguez (those who live in low property wealth districts) and that in Brown (those who
live in low income neighborhoods). See 386 F. Supp. at 122.
198. 386 F. Supp. at 123. As in Hobson v. Hansen, however, the court also had before it
a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race, the paradigm suspect class,
requiring the board to show that there were compelling - not just rational - interests in
maintaining the system of teacher transfers. The disparities in expenditures caused
primarily by the board's voluntary teacher transfer policy, since they discriminated on the
basis of race, were held to be "constitutionally unacceptable" because neither "administra-
tive convenience" nor "employee desires" are compelling state interests. Id. at 125.
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C. Summary: What the Courts Have Said about Equal Educational
Opportunity
Is equal educational opportunity a constitutionally protected right?
If it is, does the definition of equal educational opportunity vary for
different categories of children? At the least, the Supreme Court has
said that equal educational opportunity means that the state may not
establish and maintain separate schools for minority children even if
the education provided in those schools is equal to that provided white
children. When, however, the state has been found to have violated the
equal protection clause by its deliberate maintenance of racially isolated
schools, an appropriate remedy for the state's victims may include
special and additional educational services over and above those
provided other children. These decisions, however, may have nothing to
do with the right to equal educational opportunity but rather concern
the right of racial minorities not to be discriminated against in the
provision of any public service. The Supreme Court has suggested,
though, that any child (not necessarily a member of a racial minority)
who is absolutely deprived of an education, when the state has made
education available to others, might have a constitutional claim. Beyond
that, we can only speculate and extrapolate from non-education and
non-constitutional opinions of the Supreme Court to arrive at a possible
definition of that equal educational opportunity that is a con-
stitutionally guaranteed right.
For example, the Court's treatment of suspect classifications in
non-education cases suggests that disparities in educational expendi-
tures or services, where minority children are intentionally provided
lower quality services, would be unconstitutional in the absence of a
compelling justification by the state. Similarly, the intentional provision
of unequal education services to one gender would be unconstitutional
unless the classification were at least substantially related to an
important governmental interest.
Pushing the language used by the majority in Lau v. Nichols, which
was decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, to its
logical extension, may yield another plausible definition of equal
educational opportunity. It is possible to argue that a child who is
compelled to attend a classroom in which he cannot understand the
language of instruction is constructively deprived of any meaningful
education unless he or she is provided with special assistance. And this
might extend not only to a language-minority child but also to a deaf
child or a child with other severe handicapping conditions.
Some, but clearly not all, lower courts have, at least in the case of
the handicapped, implicitly accepted this argument. They tie the notion
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of constructive exclusion to Rodriguez' suggestion of an "absolute
deprivation" test in order to find that handicapped children not only
have a constitutional right not to be totally excluded from an education
but also have a right to an "appropriate" education. The courts have not
gone as far, however, in the case of language minorities.
Finally, the only intradistrict wealth discrimination case to arise in
the post-Rodriguez era suggests that there will be little significant
attempt to distinguish that case and find a constitutionally protected
right to an equal education where inequalities are based on wealth -
even if personal wealth.
This review of the cases suggests that the courts have been
somewhat reluctant to expand the number of classes entitled to special
judicial protection or to find that some level of education is a
fundamental right - particularly where an affirmative governmental
duty is claimed in the absence of any prior discrimination. Except in a
few instances then - primarily in the area of the handicapped'" - the
courts, contrary to popular belief, have largely left to the legislature the
function of re-allocating education revenues among conflicting
claimants.
III. EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: THE CONGRESS
A. Increasing the Number of Protected Classes
The refusal of the Supreme Court to find a constitutional entitle-
ment to an education and the reluctance of lower courts to expand the
number of classes entitled to special judicial protection has led to
pressure on the legislative branch to expand the number of classes. This
pressure has come from groups who see access to equal and adequate
education as attainable only through having themselves designated as
separate and in need of special treatment.
Congress has not been quite as reluctant to respond to these groups
as have the courts. It has used the enforcement clause of the fourteenth
amendment2°° and its taxing and spending power"°' to enact a variety of
199. It should be noted that most of the cases that concerned the right of the
handicapped as a class to access to equal educational opportunity, and that involved
substantial reallocations of education revenues, were consent decrees, e.g., LeBanks v.
Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), or were based on an interpretation of a
statutory rather than constitutional obligation, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp.
866 (D.D.C. 1972).
200. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this Article." U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5; see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1966).




anti-discrimination statutes that impose special conditions on recipients
of government aid.2 ' Among the groups thus determined by statute to be
entitled to special protection are women, the physically, mentally and
linguistically handicapped, the economically disadvantaged, Indians,
and migrant workers' children. 20 3
In both the conditions attached to its spending programs and its
statutory requirements of non-discrimination, Congress has also said
that certain groups are entitled to more than equal treatment. School
authorities are required, in some circumstances, to treat certain groups
unequally by allocating to their education additional resources and
special services beyond those provided the average child.
This section presents some illustrations of Congress' attempt to
guarantee equal educational opportunity, 2 ' and outlines some of the
potential institutional and political problems inherent in that attempt.
B. Special Treatment vs. Non-Discrimination
1. Racial Minorities
In 1964 Congress enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which
provided that no person could "be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" on the
grounds of race, color, or national origin. 20 The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare promulgated "guidelines" to implement Title
V 2 ° and subsequently adopted regulations.2 0 7 The legislation and the
202. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-5 (1976); Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
203. In some cases, most notably the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.),
Congress has consciously designed its legislation to parallel several lower court decrees.
See S. Rep. No. 94-168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. See also Kirp, Law, Politics, and Equal Educational Opportunity:
The Limits of Judicial Involvement, 47 HARV. ED. REV. 117, 134-36 (1977).
204. A substantial number of state legislatures have followed suit, but a detailed
examination of state legislation is beyond the scope of this Article.
205. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976)).
206. See OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT, OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICIES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (1965). These
guidelines included minimum standards for use in determining whether a local school
board's desegregation plan would qualify the district for federal financial assistance. The
school must plan to desegregate the faculty and staff and eliminate all discrimination with
respect to programs, activities, facilities, and services; the plan must contain information
that prepares the pupils, teachers, staff, and community for the changes involved in
1979]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
regulations were significant factors in moving the South in the late
sixties from token desegregation, at best, to integration, particularly
when endorsed by the courts.' With but a few exceptions,2 however,
Congress has now largely abandoned the issue of equal educational
opportunity for racial minorities to the courts, and, indeed, the
predominant congressional response has been a negative one. Thus, in
the area of race, the "backlash" phenomenon has already begun. 1
Legislation has been specifically enacted to impede or undercut the
desegregation process. Anti-busing legislation that prohibits the use of
federal funds for transportation to carry out a court-ordered school
desegregation plan"' and prohibits any federal agency from requiring or
encouraging busing past neighborhood schools impedes the process. 212
The requirement in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act that eligible students be concentrated before compensatory educa-
tion funds are allocated undercuts desegregation efforts by discouraging
the dispersal of low-income students who, in urban areas, are predomi-
nantly members of minority groups.213
desegregating the school system; the desegregation plans must be publicized conspicuously
throughout the community; and notice must be sent to pupils affected describing their
rights under the plan.
207. 29 Fed. Reg. 16,298 & 16,988 (1964), 30 Fed. Reg. 35 (1965) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
Part 80 (1979)). Under these regulations, school districts that have abandoned past
discriminatory practices, but in which "the consequences of such practices continue to
impede the full availability of a benefit," and school districts that through no past or
present discriminatory practice nevertheless fail to provide equal benefits to some racial or
nationality group must affirmatively act to insure that all are adequately served. 45
C.F.R. § 805(i)-j). In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), however,
five Justices of the Supreme Court indicated that the kind of "affirmative action" program
for minorities used by the University of California Medical School at Davis was
impermissible under Title VI.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), affd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967). See also Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v.
Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoS. 7 (1975).
209. In 1972 Congress enacted the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1619
(1976), designed to assist school districts undergoing desegregation. The Act provides
funds for remedial programs, in-service teacher training, and the development of new
curricula - many of the same programs that the Supreme Court said in Milliken II federal
courts may require as part of a remedial order to restore the victim of unconstitutional
conduct to the position in which he would have been had there not been discrimination.
See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
210. See text accompanying notes 317 & 318 infra.
211. See The Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1976).
212. See id. § 1652(b). See also id. § 1656 (removing power of United States courts to
issue order seeking to achieve racial balance in any school by requiring transportation of
students from one school to another or one school district to another); id. § 1755 (all other
remedies must be found inadequate before busing is a permissible remedial tool).
213. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 2732(a) (Supp. 1979) (original version at 20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(1)
(1978)); 45 C.F.R. § 116c (1978).
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For the most part, then, Congress has not enacted any broad scale
programs providing special assistance to racial minorities or requiring
the states to provide preferential unequal treatment for racial minor-
ities as such.2"4 Limited as it is to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the
federal effort has been simply to bar government-imposed discrimina-
tion or to require the removal of government-imposed barriers.
2. Gender Discrimination
With the passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
Congress expressed its concern with the differential treatment of
students based solely on sex. Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
... ,"5 The legislation's implementing regulations indicate that some
constitutionally acceptable government-imposed discrimination might
be barred.21 6 But the Vorchheimer result - that female students may be
excluded, solely on the basis of sex, from all-male schools where there is
an all-female school of comparable quality217 - is permissible under
Title IX218 as well as under the Constitution. Thus Congress has
perpetuated gender-separate but equal facilities.
214. Of course, other federal programs have a substantial impact on racial and ethnic
minorities. See, e.g., Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. 1979); Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3221-3261
(Supp. 1979).
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
216. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 86.21(b)(2) (1979) (no test that has a disproportionate adverse
effect on persons on the basis of sex may be administered as a criterion for admission); id.
§ 86.23(b) (can not recruit primarily at institutions that admit as students only or
predominantly members of one sex if such actions have the effect of discriminating on the
basis of sex); id. § 86.34(d) (use of single standard of measuring skill or progress in
physical education class that has adverse effect on members of one sex prohibited).
217. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally
divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)(1976) limits the effect of the basic prohibitory language
quoted in the text accompanying note 215 supra with the following caveat: "[Iln regard to
admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of
vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public
institutions of undergraduate higher education ..... 45 C.F.R. § 86.35(b) (1979),
implementing Title IX, provides:
A recipient which is a local educational agency shall not, on the basis of sex,
exclude any person from admission to:
(b) Any . . . school or educational unit operated by such recipient, unless such
recipient otherwise makes available to such person, pursuant to the same policies and
criteria of admission, courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course,
service, and facility offered in or through such schools.
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Title IX will not, however, permit the exclusion of women (or men)
from an academically elite, a vocational, or any other school if there is
no comparable institution for the opposite sex,219 nor will it permit the
use of differential admissions criteria." Moreover, Title IX regulations
prohibit sex-separated health, industrial, business, vocational-technical,
home economics, and music courses, and sex-based differential course
requirements for graduation, such as home economics for girls and
industrial arts for boys.221 Separate physical education classes are
prohibited, although students may be grouped by ability if the grouping
is based on an assessment of individual skills and not on the sex of the
student." Discrimination on the basis of sex in the counseling or
guidance of students is also outlawed by Title IX.22 3 Finally, Title IX
regulations prohibit the exclusion of pregnant students or students who
are parents from any education program or activity unless the student
chooses to participate in a separate program or activity.224
Thus, by and large, the Congressional concern to provide equal
educational opportunity for women - as with racial minorities - is
focused on barring government-imposed discrimination on the basis of
gender or requiring removal of government-imposed barriers. In some
instances, this will mean significant expenditures of money by state and
local authorities, primarily in the area of athletics.2 5 But Congress has
219. 45 C.F.R. at § 86.35.
220. A student may not be excluded on the basis of sex from admission to a school
unless comparable courses, services, and facilities are otherwise made available "pursuant
to the same policies and criteria of admissions . Id. § 86.35(b).
221. Id. § 86.34.
222. Id. § 86.34(b).
223. Id. § 86.36.
224. Id. § 86.40(b)(1).
225. Id. § 86.41(c) provides in part:
A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will
consider, among other factors:
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches ....
[Tihe Director may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one
sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.
See also id. § 86.34 (recipient can not "refuse participation therein by any of its students on
[the basis of sex], including health, physical education, industrial, business, vocation,
technical, home economics, music and adult education courses."). Thus, a school district
may be required to commit additional funds to provide more classes in these areas should
there be a demand from students previously excluded on the basis of gender.
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not enacted a major program of either federal aid or mandated state
expenditures to remove barriers not of the government's own making. In
other words, equal treatment of both genders is required, not the
singling out of one gender for preferential unequal treatment.226
3. Language Minorities
Where students of limited English-speaking ability are involved,
Congress has gone further than merely prohibiting unequal treatment.
The Bilingual Education Act, passed in 1968 as an amendment to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, makes funds available for
pilot programs in bilingual education for school districts that wish to
apply.227 The purpose of the act, as the preamble states, is "to encourage
• . .educational programs using bilingual educational practices, techni-
ques, and methods .... ."I' Instruction "to the extent necessary" is to
be in the native language of the student with limited English-speaking
ability. 9
Congress has thus made a substantial commitment to guaranteeing
the equal educational opportunity of language minorities by funding
programs aimed at affirmatively removing barriers not of the govern-
ment's making. It is very interesting to note, however, that in so doing
Congress is stressing one particular educational technique: bilingual
education. There are other techniques and there is significant controver-
sy as to which approach is of greater educational value to language-
minority children. Some social science research indicates that language-
minority children make greater gains when assigned to standard
classrooms.3 Other research suggests that bilingual programs facilitate
226. Several Supreme Court cases suggest, however, that if Congress so desired,
preferential treatment for females could be mandated. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S.
313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). This is in contrast to the more cautious position Justice Powell took in Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), with regard to race.
227. Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979) (originally
enacted as the Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, Title VII,
§ 702, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 816 (1967)).
228. Id. § 3222(a)(7)(A).
229. Id. § 3223(a)(4)(A)(i).
230. The simplest approach is to provide English as a Second Language (ESL)
instruction. An ESL program does not provide instruction in the child's native language,
but the child receives his regular subject matter instruction in classes with English-
speaking classmates and is removed from the regular classroom for an intensive program
of instruction in English.
One of the strongest arguments against a need to teach students first in their
native language is made by a second-language learning study conducted at Montreal's St.
Lambert School. Beginning in kindergarten, English-speaking children were taught
subject matter entirely in French. English was introduced later as a separate subject. The
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learning more than do English as a Second Language programs. 3'
Drawing any definitive conclusions from research on bilingual education
is not possible at this time, however, because much of the research
suffers from serious methodological defects.232
The Bilingual Education Act represents the carrot approach to
removing language barriers. The alternative to the carrot is the stick -
cutting off federal funds under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Title VI
provides: "No person . . . shall, on the ground of. . . national origin,
. . . be denied the benefits of. . . any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 3 The Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols
held that this statutory provision and the corresponding policy guideline
promulgated by HEW"4 required a school district receiving federal funds
students learned as well in French as their English-speaking peers did in English. They
also became near-native speakers of French while learning English. Similar programs in
the Montreal area have shown the same results. This study is reported in N. EPSTEIN,
LANGUAGE, ETHNICITY, AND THE SCHOOLS: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR BILINGUAL-BICULTURAL
EDUCATION 53 (1977). See also A Storm Brews Over Bilingual Teaching, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, March 6, 1978, at 59 (quoting Professor Gary Orfield's criticism of current
bilingual programs: that they are often "expensive, highly segregated programs of no
proven educational value to children.")
231. See, e.g., N. EPSTEIN, supra note 230, at 51-53; A. LEIBOWrTZ, EDUCATIONAL POLICY
AND POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE: THE IMPOSITION OF ENGLISH AS THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION
IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1971) (ERIC Clearinghouse for Linguistics); GonzAles, Coming of
Age in Bilingual/Bicultural Education: A Historical Perspective, 19 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 5,
8 (1975); Stencil, Bilingual Education, 1977-2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REP. 617, 624-26.
Other research indicates that bilingual programs facilitate learning, especially in
mathematics. See, e.g., Balinsky and Peng, An Evaluation of Bilingual Education for
Spanish Speaking Children, 9 URBAN EDUC. 271, 277 (1974). ESL might be open to attack
on other fronts. See, e.g., A Storm Brews Over Bilingual Teaching, supra note 230, at 59
(quoting Professor GonzAles' criticism of stress on mastering English first for "helpling to]
maintain the outdated melting-pot syndrome which discourages cultural pluralism in
American society.").
232. See, e.g., N. EPSTEIN, supra note 230, at 51-53; Cardenas, Response I, in N.
EPSTEIN, supra note 230, at 74-76. Cardenas refers to an Intercultural Development
Research Association (IDRA) analysis of a study of bilingual education conducted by the
American Institute for Research (AIR). Included among the flaws IDRA found in the AIR
study were:
(1) Language classifications were done subjectively by teachers in spite of a body
of research which points to the unreliability of teacher judgment as an indicator of the
language characteristics of students.
(2) Half of the teachers classifying students in the various language categories
did not speak any language other than English.
(7) Program characteristics varied considerably as to . . . instructional metho-
dologies. Impact findings did not control for such differences.
Id. See also A Storm Brews Over Bilingual Teaching, supra note 230, at 59.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
234. 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
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to provide assistance to students with English language deficiencies.135
The Court did not specify whether remedial English, English as a
Second Language, or bilingual educational programs were required.23 6
Nor was it clear whether only those who are totally deprived of an
education because they cannot understand the language in which it is
offered are to be helped or whether school districts must also assist
low achievers who are capable of receiving some benefit from the
education offered, but whose performance would be improved if they
received special treatment.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols, HEW's
Office for Civil Rights promulgated the so-called "Lau Remedies ''237
guidelines for determining school district compliance with Title VI.
Under the guidelines, school districts are expected to provide bilingual,
rather than English as a Second Language, instruction. Although the
guidelines are not binding, in order to be in compliance with Title VI, a
school district not providing bilingual education has the burden of
showing that its approach is at least as effective as that recommended
by HEW. 23
In 1974 Congress incorporated into statutory language the regula-
tions promulgated by HEW to implement Title VI and relied upon by
the Court in Lau: "No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to
an individual on account of his or her. . . national origin, by . . .the
failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its
instructional programs."' ' 9 This provision of the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act clearly establishes the principle that the state must
affirmatively overcome the language deficiencies of limited English-
235. 414 U.S. at 568. Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, stressing the large
number (about 1,800) of children involved in the case. For him, "numbers are at the heart
of this case . Id. at 572.
236.
No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English to the students of Chinese
ancestry who do not speak the language is one choice. Giving instruction to this group
in Chinese is another. There may be others. Petitioners ask only that the Board of
Education be directed to apply its expertise to the problem and rectify the situation.
Id. at 564-65.
237. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, TASK
FORCE FINDINGS SPECIFYING REMEDIES FOR ELIMINATING PAST EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES
RULED UNLAWFUL UNDER LAU V. NICHOLS (1975).
238. Id. at 7-10.




speaking students.2" It also suggests that Congress has answered the
question raised above: that assistance must be provided low-achieving
language-minority students above and beyond that which would merely
enable them to participate in the educational program being offered, but
which rather would enable them to participate equally.
In the area of bilingual education, then, Congress has clearly
responded to the demands of certain disadvantaged groups for affirma-
tive governmental action to overcome deficiencies that were not of the
government's making. Congress has singled out children whose native
language is not English as a category entitled to special educational
assistance even though few courts have found this to be a constitutional-
ly required obligation.14' Moreover, significant expenditures are un-
doubtedly required by states to comply with the congressional command,
especially since Congress and HEW have indicated a strong, almost
mandatory, preference for bilingual education - a controversial
approach4 2 that is more expensive than other approaches that might be
used.""
One interesting development that could result in special programs
for blacks even where there has been no prior history of discrimination
240. In remanding a case dealing with the charge that the failure of the school district
to meet the "special needs of its Mexican-American students" is unconstitutional
discrimination, the Fifth Circuit noted that although the matter of bilingual-bicultural
education should probably be left to educators and not courts, the district court must
nevertheless consider the matter, since "[ilt is now an unlawful educational practice to fail
to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers." Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d
411, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975). The court cited both the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act and Lau v. Nichols. Id. Accord, Cintron v. Brentwood Union
Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In holding a school board's plan to
"immerse" language-minority children in the English language and culture unacceptable,
the court noted that the underlying theory of the plan
overlooks the declaration of policy and the findings of the Congress as embodied in
Section 105(a)(1) of the Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880(b), the statutory
right of the non-English speaking child recognized under Section 204 of the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703, Section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the teaching of Lau, and the suggestions of the Lau
guidelines promulgated for the purpose of demonstrating methods of compliance with
statutory and decisional requirements.
Id. at 63. Thus the court required the school district to provide a program that was both
bilingual and bicultural. Id. at 64.
241. See text accompanying notes 122 to 136 supra.
242. See notes 231 to 233 supra.
243. Only a few courts have gone so far as to hold that Title VI and the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act require not only bilingual but also bicultural instruction
with bilingual teachers, not just aides, and have declared a school district's program of
English as a Second Language in violation of federal law. See Cintron v. Brentwood Union
Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 351 F.
Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), affd on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
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lurks in the opinion of the federal district court in Martin Luther King,
Jr. Elementary School Children v. Michigan Board of Education.2" In
that case plaintiffs, black elementary school children, claimed that the
school system's failure to provide "special education services to children
whose unsatisfactory academic performance is based on their cultural,
social, or economic backgrounds" violated their civil rights. 45 Denying
the defendants' motion to dismiss, the court agreed that the plaintiffs
had stated a claim that the local educational agency had failed to take
appropriate action to overcome language barriers in violation of the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act.2" The court held that a de jure
segregated school system was not a prerequisite to finding a denial of
equal educational opportunity under the statute and that "language
barrier" as used in the statute could be interpreted to include a child's
inability to use standard English effectively because that child's native
language is "Black English. 2 47
4. Handicapped Students
With the passage of the Rehabilitation Act of 197348 and the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,249 the federal role
in the education of the handicapped took a quantum leap. Under these
acts, school officials may not exclude children or treat them differently
because of a handicap without risking loss of federal funds. 5 Not only
must such children not be excluded from a free public education, but
they also must be provided an "appropriate" public education."'
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise
qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
244. 451 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
245. Id. at 1327.
246. Id. at 1332. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as not well
founded. Id. at 1328-29.
247. Id. at 1331-32. The remedy the court finally imposed was to require special
training of teachers so that they could recognize Black English and know enough about it
to be able to teach its speakers to use standard English. Martin Luther King, Jr. Elem.
School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist. Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (1979).
248. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976)).
The Act was amended in 1974 to include education as well as employment. Rehabilita-
tion Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974).
249. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 775 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1976)).
250. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(2)(B), 1412(2)(C), 1412(5), 1416(a)(2)(B) (1976); 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1976).




of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ,,,,1 The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (Public Law 94-142) provides funds to assist
states in meeting the educational needs of handicapped children and in
protecting their parents' rights."3 Thus, while the requirements of
section 504 are mandatory for all states and school districts that receive
any federal funding,25 4 the requirements of Public Law 94-142 are
binding only on those states and districts receiving funds allocated
under the Act.255 No funds are provided by Congress under section 504,
and the funds provided under Public Law 94-142, while a significant
total, fall far short of the amount a state needs to be able to comply with
the act's requirements.
Both statutes require that states provide handicapped children with
a free, appropriate public education, educate handicapped and non-
handicapped children together to the extent appropriate, identify and
locate all unserved handicapped children, assure the provision of proper
classification and educational services, and establish procedural safe-
guards.256 The statutes differ in various ways, however.2 57 For example,
section 504's definition of a "handicapped individual" as "any person
who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment ' '2
includes drug addicts (and those with a history of drug abuse) and
alcoholics.2 59 The definition of the term "handicapped children" used in
252. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). The regulations implementing § 504 are found at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 84.1-.61 (1979).
253. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976). For analyses of P.L. 94-142, see generally
Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards A Definition of an Appropriate
Education, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 984-93 (1977); Krass, The Right to Public Education for
Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1016, 1063-77;
Levinson, supra note 164, at 276-81.
254. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 84.2 (1979).
255. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.2(a) (1979).
256. 45 C.F.R. Part 121a, app. A at 500 (1977). This Appendix is a comprehensive
analysis of the final regulations promulgated under P.L. 94-142. It has not been included
in the current edition of C.F.R. A similar analysis of the regulations implementing § 504 is
found at 45 C.F.R. Part 84 app. A at 377 (1979).
257. Section 504 is more comprehensive than P.L. 94-142. For example, it applies to
postsecondary education as well as to elementary and secondary education, 45 C.F.R.
§§ 84.41-.47 (1979), to program accessibility, id. §§ 84.21-.23, and to employment by
educational institutions, id. §§ 84.11-.14. P.L. 94-142 applies only to preschool, elemen-
tary, and secondary education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.122 (1979).
258. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. 1979); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1979).
259. 45 C.F.R. Part 84 app. A at 378-79 (1979).
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Public Law 94-142 is not as broad in scope, since it only includes
"mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired,
or other health-impaired children with specific learning disabilities, who
by reason thereof require special education and related services."
' 6°
The definition of "free appropriate public education" also differs
slightly under the two statutes. The regulations promulgated under
section 504 define an "appropriate" education as:
the provision of a regular or special education and related aids or
services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational needs
of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of non-
handicapped persons are met and (ii) are based upon adherence to
procedures that satisfy the requirements [specified elsewhere in the
laws and regulations]. 6 '
Under Public Law 94-142, an appropriate education is defined as
special education and related services designed to "meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child . *... 1112 Thus, Public Law 94-142
requires special education and related services to be provided in
accordance with an individualized education program,"3 whereas section
504 requires regular or special education and related aids, which are
designed to meet the individual needs of handicapped persons as
adequately as the needs of non-handicapped persons are met.21 One
commentator has interpreted the section 504 definition as going further
than Public Law 94-142, noting that section 504 suggests that the
260. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(a) (1979).
261. 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1) (1979) (emphasis added).
An appropriate education could consist of education in regular classes, education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary services, or special education and
related services. Special education may include specially designed instruction in
classrooms, at home, or in private or public institutions and may be accompanied by
such related services as developmental, corrective, and other supportive services
(including psychological, counseling, and medical diagnostic services). ...
The quality of the educational services provided to handicapped students must
equal that of the services provided to non-handicapped students; thus, handicapped
student's teachers must be trained in the instruction of persons with the handicap in
question and appropriate materials and equipment must be available.
Id. Part 84 app. A at 388.
262. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) & (18) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4 & .14 (1979).
263. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)(D) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.4(d) (1979).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 84.33(b)(1) (1979).
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quality of the programs for handicapped and non-handicapped children
should be equal regardless of cost.26
An "appropriate" education is one that takes place in the least
restrictive educational setting.66 And under both acts, even if the
regular educational setting is inappropriate for. academic subjects,
handicapped students are to participate with non-handicapped students
in non-academic and extracurricular services.267
Congress has thus mandated "mainstreaming" the handicapped.
The burden is put on the educational system to show that the child could
not be educated satisfactorily in a regular classroom. This is the case
despite the fact that not all educators and psychologists agree that
"mainstreaming" is the best approach for at least one large handicapped
group, the mentally retarded, particularly if the school system fails to
provide the necessary supporting services for the child and fails to
provide training for the regular classroom teacher. 6
265. Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 253, at 986.
266. "A recipient shall place a handicapped person in the regular educational
environment . . .unless it is demonstrated by the recipient that the education of the
person in the regular environment with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily." 45 C.F.R. § 84.34(a) (1979).
Post-secondary educational institutions must "take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that no handicapped student is denied the benefits of. . .the education program or
activity . . . because of the absence of educational auxiliary aids for students with
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills." Id. § 84.44(d)(1). These auxiliary aids
include "taped texts, interpreters [for] students with hearing impairments, readers in
libraries for students with visual impairments, classroom equipment adapted for use by
students with manual impairments, and other similar services and activities." Id.
§ 84.44(d)(2). However, recipients are not required to provide "attendants, individually
prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices or services of a
personal nature." Id. § 84.44(d)(2).
Under Public Law 94-142, handicapped children may be removed "from the
regular educational environment . . . only when the nature or severity of the handicap is
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.550(b)(2). See
generally Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975: A Legislative History and Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REV.
717 (1978).
267. 45 C.F.R. §§84.34(b), 121a.553 (1979). See also 45 C.F.R. §§84.37(a)(1), (2),
121a.306.
268. Results of studies on ability grouping generally are mixed with regard to the
advantages of homogeneous versus heterogenous grouping. See, e.g., N. HoBs, THE
FUTURES OF CHILDREN 37-41 (1975); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 107-08 (1972); R. MILLS & M.
BRYAN, TESTING . . .GROUPING: THE NEW SEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS? 4-7 (1976);
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASS'N, RESEARCH Div., ABILITY GROUPING, RESEARCH SUMMARY 8-10
(1968); Alexander, Cook & McDill, Curriculum Tracking and Educational Stratification:
Some Further Evidence, 43 AMER. Soc. REV. 47, 64 (1978); Esposito, Homogeneous and
Heterogeneous Ability Grouping: Principal Findings and Implications for Evaluating and
Designing More Effective Educational Environments, 43 REV. ED. RES. 163, 167 (1973);
Goodlad, Classroom Organization, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 223-24 (3d
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The "free" education in both statutes means that if the handicapped
child must be educated in a private institution, the school district must
pay the costs.69 These costs, of course, can be quite high. In addition, the
"related services" to which Public Law 94-142 refers includes a costly
array:
transportation, and such developmental, corrective and other sup-
portive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psycho-
logical services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and
medical and counseling services, except that such medical services
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special
education, and [related services] includes the early identification
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children.
2 70
Congress and the executive branch have thus been much more
specific about the scope of an appropriate education than have the
courts. 2 ' The consent agreements in PARC and LeBanks, approved by
the courts, provide the most detailed, non-statutory example of what
was believed to be required in an appropriate education. The agreement
in PARC required the state to provide mentally retarded children with
free public programs of education and training appropriate to a child's
capacity, with the presumption that placement in a regular public
school class is the preferred mode of education.22  The LeBanks
agreement provided that placement in a regular public school class with
ed. 1960); Passow, The Maze of Research on Ability Grouping, 26 Enuc. F. 281, 281 (1962);
Richer, Reference-Group Theory and Ability Grouping: A Convergence of Sociological
Theory and Education Research, 49 Soc. EDUC. 65, 67 (1976). This is also true with regard
to the educable mentally retarded. Compare Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly
Retarded - Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968) with MacMillan,
Special Education for the Mildly Retarded: Servant or Savant?, Focus ON EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN, Feb. 1971, at 1. See also Fink & Glass, Contemporary Issues in the Education of
the Behaviorally Disordered, 1 FIRST REv. OF SPECIAL EDUC. 137 (1973).
269.
Under § 504 a "free" education is the provision of educational and related services
without cost to the handicapped person . . . except for those fees that are imposed on
non-handicapped persons. . . . It may consist either of the provision of free services or,
if a recipient places a handicapped person in . .. a program not operated by the
recipient ..., of payment for the costs of the program.
45 C.F.R. § 84.33(c)(1) (1979).
270. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1979). See also 45 C.F.R. Part 84
app. A at 361 (1979).
271. See pp. 226 to 238 supra.




appropriate support services is preferred over isolation of handicapped
children and required evaluation and development of a special education
plan for each child along with a free public education appropriate to the
child's age and mental statusY.3 In these consent agreements and in the
court order handed down in Mills,"4 "mainstreaming" handicapped
children, that is, placing them in regular public school classes rather
than special education classes, is preferred. The two federal statutes go
further than these cases, however, in requiring educational agencies to
offer handicapped children non-academic and extracurricular services
and activities together with non-handicapped children or at least that
such services be equivalent.275
Only a few cases have been decided under these statues, with
somewhat conflicting results. Several cases have involved the require-
ment that handicapped students be placed in regular classes with the
use of supplementary services unless the education of such students
cannot be accomplished satisfactorily in such an environment. In
Hairston v. Drosick,27 6 parents of a child with spina bifida, a condition
that left the child with minor physical impairments, alleged that the
school district's refusal to admit their child to regular classes violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court held that to exclude a
handicapped child from the regular public school classroom without a
compelling educational justification constituted discrimination in viola-
tion of section 504.211 School officials were ordered to "make every effort
to include such children within the regular public classroom situation,
even at great expense to the school system.""2 ' The court cited testimony
that showed that placement in as normal an environment as possible
would achieve maximum benefits for a child and that placement in an
abnormal environment with little peer interaction imposes great
burdens on a handicapped child.2 9 Homebound instruction or assign-
ment to a special education class for physically handicapped children
rather than placement in a regular classroom with special services was
not an "appropriate" education.21
273. LeBanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135, 140 (E.D. La. 1973).
274. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.D.C. 1972).
275. See note 267 supra.
276. 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
277. Id. at 184.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 183.
280. Cf Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977) (college's




Other cases have involved questions of what is an appropriate
education under the statutes. In a case arising in Texas, parents of a
learning disabled and emotionally disturbed child sought injunctive
relief to ensure that he receive appropriate education.' The child had
received special services while attending junior high school, but when
he entered high school and developed emotional and behavioral
difficulties, he was disciplined rather than being referred to the special
education department. He was finally expelled from the school. 82 The
court, in granting a preliminary injunction, found that the high school
had failed to provide him with a free, appropriate public education2' 3 and
failed to provide an individualized education program meeting his
unique needs, in violation of section 504.2" The court ordered the
defendants to evaluate the child's educational needs, develop an
individual education plan to meet them, and provide a free, appropriate
education in a normal setting with non-handicapped children, to the
maximum extent possible.28 Thus, the court determined that section 504
creates an affirmative duty to diagnose a handicapped student's
difficulties and provide an education suitable to overcome those
difficulties.
A suit challenging a school district's refusal to provide a full-time
tutor for an autistic child was recently brought under both section 504
and Public Law 94-142.2u A motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim was denied by the district court on the ground that "if the right to
an appropriate education is to be meaningful, it must encompass - even
at considerable expense - the provision of a full-time tutor in the home
of an autistic child who cannot fit into another educational setting. '287
Such a claim was therefore actionable under section 504 and Public Law
94-142.
Finally, several challenges to the length of the school year have
been brought under the federal requirement of "appropriate" public
education for the handicapped. Plaintiffs in a suit in Pennsylvania
alleged that for severely handicapped children "appropriate" education
means year-round programs either in public schools or in private schools
281. Howard S. v. Friendswood Ind. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
282. Id. at 639.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 641.
285. Id. at 642.
286. Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
287. Id. at 1109.
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at public expense.2" The district court held that the failure to operate a
year-round program deprived such severely handicapped children of an
appropriate education in violation of Public Law 94-142.
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,"' the Supreme Court
seems to have limited the application of section 504. In a unanimous
opinion, the Court held the statute not to require a community college to
admit to its nursing program an applicant who had a hearing disability.
The Fourth Circuit had directed the district court to consider whether
the college could be required to modify the nursing program's require-
ments to accommodate the plaintiff."9
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an "otherwise qualified"
handicapped individual is one "who is able to meet all of a program's
requirements in spite of his handicap. '29 1 It found that the physical
qualification Southeastern Community College required the plaintiff to
meet - the ability to understand speech without relying on lipreading
- was essential for participation in its nursing program.92 Southeast-
ern's stated goal of training students who would be able to perform all
the normal roles of a registered nurse was a legitimate academic
policy. 93 Even if the plaintiff could meet some less demanding state
licensing requirement, the Court held, section 504 does not require an
educational institution to lower its standards. 4
The plaintiff had argued that under the Act and its regulations the
college must take some affirmative action to modify the standards of the
program so that oral communication is not essential, citing provisions in
the regulations that require recipients of federal funds to modify their
programs and provide auxiliary aids."9 The Court held that the
288. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979). A suit making a similar
claim was filed on behalf of autistic children in Michigan, noting that such children would
regress educationally during the summer vacation. Michigan State Soc'y for Autistic
Children v. Porter, No. 78-72804 (S.D. Mich., filed November 2, 1978).
289. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
290. Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978). The
court cited 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.44(a) and 84.44(d)(1) in support. Id. at 1162. Those regulations
provide that "[a] recipient ... shall make such modifications to its academic require-
ments as are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not discriminate ... on the
basis of handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant or student," 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.44(a)(1979), and that "[al recipient ... shall take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that no handicapped student is ... excluded from participation ... because of the
absence of educational auxiliary aids for students with impaired sensory, manual, or
speaking skills," id. § 84.44(d)(1).
291. 442 U.S. at 406.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 412-13.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 407-09. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.44.
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regulations in question do not require the college to alter fundamentally
the nature of its program, construing section 504 as reflecting a
congressional intent that qualified handicapped persons be treated
evenhandedly, not that affirmative efforts be made to overcome
handicaps.'
The decision thus suggests that to the extent the handicapped
student's participation would require fundamental changes in the
nature and goals of the program, or lowering the program's standards,
an educational institution, at least at the post-secondary level,2 97 is
justified in refusing to admit such a student. The Court did not,
however, indicate that affirmative efforts on the part of school officials
are never required. It recognized that "situations may arise where a
refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory." 8 Such a situation would occur, according to the Court,
when handicapped persons could participate "without imposing undue
financial and administrative burdens upon a State."'
Although restricting the scope of the Act by finding that an
"otherwise qualified" handicapped person is one who, if treated as any
other person and without special assistance, could meet the require-
ments of the program, the decision tells us little about the extent to
which there is an affirmative duty to provide special services to enable a
child to participate in an existing program without having to modify
that program. Nor does the case say anything about the right of a child,
compelled to attend a school by state law, to an "appropriate" education
in the public schools.
The case of the handicapped presents the clearest example of an
affirmative duty imposed by Congress on state and local authorities.
There is an obligation to treat handicapped children differently by
providing special aids, services, and other resources to enable such
children to overcome barriers not of the government's own making. To
do this, the school districts are required to make substantial expendi-
tures and significantly reallocate their resources. However, in the Davis
case the Supreme Court has limited the extent to which at least
296. 442 U.S. at 410-11.
297. Several lower court cases have indicated that handicapped students might be
denied the benefits of some programs even at the elementary and secondary school level
where there is a compelling educational or other justification. See, e.g., Kampmeier v.
Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479, 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184
(S.D. W. Va. 1976).




post-secondary institutions will be required to modify their existing
programs and lower standards in order to include the handicapped.
5. Wealth Discrimination
Although Congress has not singled out low wealth districts or their
residents as groups requiring special protection or assistance, it has
provided a major program of assistance for children from low-income
groups, particularly in districts that have significant concentrations of
such children. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, 30 which provides funds for compensatory and remedial programs
for the economically deprived,"0 ' was part of the first major federal aid to
education legislation enacted.2 It requires that expenditures for these
programs must supplement, not supplant, state and local expendi-
tures .-" School districts cannot use Title I money to "free up" state and
local revenues for use in non-Title I schools. Per pupil expenditures from
state and local funds are supposed to be equal in every school, before the
federal funds are added to supplement the offerings in those schools
with predominantly low-income children. With this "supplement, not
supplant" provision, Congress has sought to remove barriers states
might have imposed on economically disadvantaged students - since
there is evidence that districts often spent less per pupil in poor schools
than in schools serving middle class populations.114
Title I obviously seeks to do more than remove state-imposed
barriers to equal educational opportunity, however. Even where school
districts have not discriminated against schools serving poor children,
Title I provides funds for special additional programs to help remove
barriers to learning not imposed by the government but resulting from
the students' socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, in some sense, the
economically disadvantaged are singled out as a separate category for
special assistance as the mentally and physically or the linguistically
handicapped students have been.
300. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2701-2854 (Supp. 1979)).
301. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (Supp. 1979).
302. See RAND CORPORATION CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, THE
FEDERAL INTEREST IN FINANCING SCHOOLING Xi (1978).
303. 20 U.S.C.A. § 2736(c), (d); 45 C.F.R. § 116b.32 (1979).
304. See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971). See also B. LEVIN,
supra note 60, at 271-309.
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C. Summary: What Congress Has Said About Equal Educational
Opportunity
Congress, authorized by section 5 of the fourteenth amendment and
the taxing and spending clause, has tried its hand at defining equal
educational opportunity. In some cases - primarily where racial
minorities or women are involved - it has merely reinforced the
approach taken by the courts under the traditional view of the equal
protection clause: state-imposed barriers to an education must be
removed. Once those barriers are removed, all students of whatever race
or gender are treated equally.
In other cases, Congress has said that certain categories of children
must be provided with special assistance, that is, treated unequally, in
order to ensure equal educational opportunity. The theory behind this
approach, of course, is that such students - because of barriers created
by national origin, disease, genetic defect, or economic circumstance,
rather than government- or even societally-imposed barriers - are
unable to take advantage of the education offered them."° Thus, the
government should provide them with the assistance needed to bring
them to the same starting line as other children. The difficulty lies in
determining what kinds of services in what amounts and at what cost to
the regular programming will be needed to bring various categories of
children to this "starting line."
IV. EXPANDING THE PROTECTED CLASSES: SOME PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS
In its five-to-four decision in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court refused
to expand the classifications entitled to special judicial protection and
refused to treat education as a constitutionally protected right.
Moreover, despite what one might wish to read into the entrails of Lau
v. Nichols, no Supreme Court decision has clearly indicated that the
305. The economically deprived were provided for by Congress in Title I, discussed in
text accompanying notes 300 to 303 supra. Among the other groups singled out by
Congress are Indian students, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 241aa-ff (Supp. 1979), and migrant workers'
children, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 2761-2763 (Supp. 1979). Indian children do not clearly belong in
this category. The barriers that stand in the way of their educational opportunity are
likely to have been imposed by the government and/or society. Migrant workers' children,
however, are closer to the class of economically deprived children. Theoretically, at least,
the isolation creating barriers to their learning has resulted more from their family
circumstances than from government action. Of course, in actuality, many school districts
have deliberately discriminated against migrant workers' children as they have discrimin-
ated against the economically disadvantaged and the physically and mentally hand-
icapped.
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Constitution requires more than equal educational services even for
suspect classes, other than as a limited remedy for prior
unconstitutional conduct on the part of the state.
As the previous sections have indicated, the approach taken by the
Supreme Court toward classifications on the basis of race, national
origin, and alienage, and to a lesser extent gender and illegitimacy, has
not, to any great degree, been extended by lower courts to include new
classifications. A few lower courts have treated handicapped and, in one
case, economically deprived students as constitutionally entitled to
special protection. In some instances, this special protection has meant
preferential treatment. And a few courts have indicated that failure to
provide special services to correct deficiencies not of the government's
making is unconstitutional because it amounts to an absolute
deprivation of that quantum of education that the Rodriguez Court
indicated might be a fundamental right.
Congress, however, has been more freewheeling about expanding
the categories of students to be given special protection by legislation.
While racial and ethnic minorities have long been thought to be entitled
to special judicial protection from the majoritarian process because as
"discrete and insular minorities" they were politically powerless,
Congress is now requiring or encouraging the protection of many other
categories. And Congress has gone beyond merely prohibiting discrimi-
natory action by officials against certain groups - that is, merely
requiring that government-imposed barriers be removed, the group in
question being entitled to equal treatment - to requiring a "suitable,"
"adequate," or "appropriate" education for certain categories of children.
This of necessity means more than "equal" education, at least in terms
of resources expended if not results obtained.
This movement to expand the concept of equality to embrace many
of the previously forgotten and maltreated groups in our society seems
clearly appropriate as an objective of our society and as a contemporary
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause."'
If the present way in which it is done persists, though, it may bear with
it some seeds of its own destruction. Some of the problems raised by the
creation of new categories and the requirement that they be given more
than equal treatment are outlined in this section of the Article.
306. Views on what constitutes unequal and discriminatory treatment under law do
change over time. As Justice Douglas has said: "[Tihe Equal Protection Clause is not
shackled to the political theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are
unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to historic notions of
equality .... " Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
EQUAL PROTECTION PREDICAMENT
First, there are no clear, readily ascertainable criteria for determin-
ing which groups should be entitled to be treated as "discrete and
insular minorities." This leads to an ad hoc approach and an increasing
proliferation of special categories, in proportion to the degree of political
pressure certain groups can bring. This ad hoc approach of creating new
classes around the fringes of the basic suspect classification doctrine,
rather than attacking the problem of education frontally, raises several
institutional considerations. First, the lesson conveyed is that those
interests that cannot command a majority in the state legislature,
rather than regrouping and attempting to develop a majority coalition of
interests, can make an end run to enlist Congress' aid in getting the
state to provide them what they could not obtain through the state's
political process. Special interest groups join across state boundaries to
form powerful lobbies in Congress to achieve what they are politically
impotent to achieve at the state level. This raises questions that go to
the core of our federal system. Increasingly, decisions about what has
been traditionally a state and local function are being made at the
federal level.
Secondly, Congressional legislation increasingly is concerned with
restrictions and constraints on the ways in which states and localities
deliver educational services and administer their educational institu-
tions, focusing on sanctions for non-compliance rather than on incen-
tives. On the one hand, there is the important societal objective of
ensuring that certain groups of children are not. denied an equal
educational opportunity by states whose majoritarian institutions are
hostile toward or at least insensitive to their plight. But it is unclear
whether this objective outweighs in every case the intrusion into state
legislative decisions regarding education, and the resulting significant
reallocation of resources and shifting of state educational priorities.
Perhaps the balance would be more clearly weighted toward the need for
federal intervention if we knew with more certainty what equal
educational opportunity is and if we were clearer about how to attain it.
Thirdly, regulating education through requirements, rather than
through fiscal and programmatic assistance, requires large expenditures
of state and local rather than federal funds, and encourages a politically
irresponsible attitude on the part of Congress. Where the federal
government imposes stringent and costly requirements on the states,
without significantly funding their implementation, states may find
that their educational priorities have to be reordered without a clear
consensus on the need for certain programs at the expense of others.
The piecemeal approach toward creating new categories presents
two additional and related problems. As the categories are divided more
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finely, more and more children are found to fit not one classification, but
several. A child could be economically disadvantaged, and thus entitled
to remedial programs of various kinds.307 If he also has limited
English-speaking ability, he is entitled to other programs."8 If he is in a
district undergoing desegregation, he is entitled to certain programs. 09
And if he has a mental or physical disability, he is entitled to still other
programs. 10 Rarely is a coordinated educational approach taken toward
a child who falls into a number of categories. He can be subjected to
inconsistent, scattershot programs and end up with minimal education,
since in many cases such children are pulled out of the regular
classroom for each special federal program. Related to this is the impact
on the educational institution itself. In many inner city schools most
students are members of "protected minorities," and most fall into more
than one category. The result is that so many competing and conflicting
requirements are imposed on school systems that the institution is in
danger of becoming overwhelmed by them, and may respond by acting
in ways that tend to frustrate program objectives or by not acting at all.
The obligation imposed on state and local governments to provide
special services to enable certain categories of children to overcome
barriers not of the government's making, the obligation to provide an
"appropriate" or "suitable" education to compensate for "deficiencies" of
language, poverty, or birth and disease, will undoubtedly lead to
considerable conflict between school officials concerned about budgetary
constraints and parents of children in the special categories. These
conflicts will have to be resolved by the courts with little congressional
guidance on standards for what is "appropriate" or "suitable." Can
courts enforce standards for an "appropriate" education where educa-
tors, clinicians, and other experts cannot agree?
The question of an "appropriate" education suitable to the needs of
handicapped children - including the emotionally disturbed and the
learning disabled - has led to some strange litigation pairings:
307. See, e.g., Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20
U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2854 (Supp. 1979).
308. See, e.g., Billingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. 1979). See
also the "Lau Remedies," supra note 238.
309. See The Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 3197, 3198 (Supp. 1979). This
Act, part of the Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2143 (1978),
replaced the 1972 version, the somewhat different but corresponding provisions of which
are found at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1607 (1976). Regulations implementing the provisions of
the old Act and detailing the many kinds of special projects in which children in
desegregating schools might be required to participate are found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 185.51-
.56, 185.91-.95-6 (1979).
310. Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1423, 1424a (1976).
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demands for placement in regular classrooms with special services and
aids3 ' compete with demands for removal from regular classrooms and
placement in special classes. 2 These cases ask whether it is better for
handicapped children to be placed together in small classes, where they
will have a specially trained teacher and more individual attention or
more important to lessen their isolation from regular school experiences
and thus perhaps reduce the psychological and social stigma often
experienced by those clearly labeled handicapped. Courts will have to
weigh the potential academic benefit of placement in a special class
against the potential social or psychological detriment."3 And even if, in
theory, such children are likely to have a better educational experience
if they are "mainstreamed," what is the effect, in practice, of placing
them in regular classrooms where teachers are not adequately trained
to deal with them and school systems have insufficient funds to provide
the necessary supporting services? The lack of agreement among social
scientists complicates the resolution of this dilemma. How much
education and of what kind is enough to meet the duty? Must sufficient
resources be provided to achieve approximately equal achievement
levels among children of vastly differing abilities?
As with the handicapped, difficult questions arise as to what is an
"appropriate" education for children of limited English-speaking ability.
Courts, in the course of applying the federal statutes, will have to
determine whether "appropriate" means bilingual-bicultural education
rather than remedial English. They will have to decide whether only
those children whose English is so limited as to make them incapable of
benefiting from the proffered education are entitled to special assistance
or whether children who are low achievers in both English and their
native language must be included. Moreover, courts, in interpreting
statutes involving language-minority children, and administrative
agencies, in implementing the legislation, at times appear to be creating
even more new categories.3 1 4
311. See, e.g., New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); Sherer v. Waier, 457 F. Supp. 1039 (W.D. Mo. 1977); Panitch v.
Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 432 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.
W. Va. 1976).
312. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fialkowski v.
Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
313. The thrust of the legislation at issue in such cases, however, seems to be to place
the burden on school officials to justify the placement on the basis of the best interests of
the child. See text accompanying notes 266 & 267 supra.
314. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Elem. School Children v. Michigan Bd. of
Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (students who speak "Black English" may have
a "language barrier" to equal participation in instructional programs within the meaning
of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act).
19791
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Can there be a fixed meaning of "appropriate" in light of the
Rodriguez decision and the disparities in expenditures between dis-
tricts? What is "appropriate" for a handicapped or language-minority
child in a high wealth-high expenditure district may not be "appropri-
ate" for a similar child in a low expenditure district if the level of
resources for those classes entitled to special treatment is measured
against the resources available for regular programming within the
same school district.
Where there are scarce resources and competing demands for them,
is the preferred distribution to the targeted group and away from the
average child? As one federal district court noted in a case involving
the issue of an appropriate education for severely emotionally handicap-
ped children, the federal requirement to spend substantially more state
and local resources on the handicapped students "may well necessitate a
sacrifice in services now afforded children in the rest of the school
system. 3 15 At what point do non-handicapped children have a claim to a
certain amount of educational services? Congress has established no
such claim, and under Rodriguez only the deprivation of some minimal
level of education might be constitutionally protected.
There has been little discussion, in the course of recent litigation
and in the enactment of legislation concerning the handicapped, of
whether the public schools should be singled out to fulfill what may be
very valid societal objectives of caring for the very severely handicap-
ped. Are schools the appropriate institution to provide such children with
toilet training or to teach them how to dress and eat?" 6 If the obligation
- constitutional and statutory - to provide a minimally satisfactory
life for the severely handicapped is imposed on the public schools in a
time of declining enrollments and other fiscal pressures, what effect will
the shift of substantial resources to these areas tenuously related to the
traditional educational function of the public schools have on the
standard educational programming for the "normal" child?
Creating new classes entitled to special treatment, rather than
dealing with education frontally, and requiring the expenditure of
significant amounts of state and local funds when there is a lack of a
clear consensus on what is an "appropriate" education for certain classes
315. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). In Lora, Judge
Weinstein noted that the average cost of educating a child in a special day school was
$6,300 per pupil plus the substantial costs of the required evaluation, procedural
safeguards, and so forth, compared to $2,300 for a regular child's education. New York
City receives only $55 per handicapped child from the federal government, so the rest of
the costs must be covered from state and local resources. Id.
316. See Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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of children, and which institutions in society should be responsible for
that "education" beyond that traditionally within the capacity of the
public schools, may have contributed to the "backlash" the country is
currently experiencing. That is, guaranteeing a certain level of educa-
tional services for a growing number of protected classes at the expense
of the white middle class has led to increased opposition against these
special groups.
Those who are not members of a "disadvantaged minority," even if
they are harmed by a school system's failure to respond to their
educational needs, have little hope of recourse from the courts, since the
most permissive standard of equal protection review will apply, and
little hope from Congress, which is providing educational services only
for classes it considers entitled to special protection. As the demography
of the school population relative to the population of society as a whole
changes - with increasing proportions of minorities in the schools, and
an aging population that is largely white - political, support for an
appropriate education as an entitlement for specially disadvantaged
classes such as the handicapped, the economically disadvantaged, or
racial and linguistic minorities may diminish still further. We have
already seen an increase in "middle class flight" to private schools. As
public school enrollment declines, pressure for private school tuition tax
credit plans"7 and other forms of aid to non-public schools increases,
and such brakes on spending for education and other public services as
the Proposition 13 legislation are promoted.3"' Thus, minorities are set
against non-minorities in the competition for shrinking resources. Since
there is no firm support in the Constitution for expanding the number of
classes to be protected, under fiscal and political pressures Congress
could cut back the "protections" and the classes being protected.
Increasingly, the phenomenon of minorities competing with other
minorities for resources has surfaced, as exemplified by the Adams v.
Califano litigation. 31 9 The initial complaint in that suit was brought on
behalf of blacks to compel HEW to require segregated school districts to
comply with Title VI. The Women's Equity Action League intervened to
insure that HEW did not give Title VI enforcement priority over Title
IX enforcement.32 Subsequently, a group representing Hispanics inter-
317. See, e.g., S. 2142, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 15625 (1977), known as
the Moynihan-Packwood Bill.
318. Initiative Measure, 1978, proposing addition of CAL CONST. art. 13A (approved
June 6, 1978).
319. Adams v. Califano, 430 F. Supp. 118 (D.D.C. 1977); Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F.
Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975); Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), affd as modified,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
320. Adams v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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vened, seeking to have resources reallocated to the enforcement of the
"national origin" desegregation requirements of Title VI,12' and a group
representing the handicapped, the National Federation of the Blind, also
intervened to insure that their concerns were not overlooked.2 2 As the
number of groups singled out for special assistance expands within a
world of finite resources, priority among the groups may become the
object of a political as well as legal struggle." And as Justice Powell
said in another context about tying the protection to which a particular
minority group is entitled to "the ebb and flow of political forces[:]
Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve
to exacerbate racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate
them."'24
Finally, the proliferation of "specially protected" classes and the
sense of competition for resources may increase, rather than decrease,
our distance from a classless and colorblind society in which people are
treated as individuals. Should education become yet another arena for
competing special interests out to grab a share before the others get it?
And does the need to label students in order to get these special
programs not only further divide children but also stigmatize some of
the target pupil populations? These many questions demand a search for
an alternative to the present solution of the problem of equal
educational opportunity.2 5
321. Id. at 418.
322. Adams v. Califano, Civ. A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C., Oct. 7, 1977) (order permitting
intervention).
323. In a case brought in Pennsylvania on behalf of children with "specific learning
disabilities," plaintiffs raised an equal protection claim that foreshadows the likely clashes
between various special interest groups over finite resources. They complained that school
officials, as a result of the PARC consent decree in that state, "are providing mentally
retarded children with a free public education especially suited to their individual needs,
but are denying learning disabled children an equal educational opportunity, namely, a
curriculum adapted to overcome their handicaps." Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp.
832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
324. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-99 (1979) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
325. Both the courts and Congress have, in certain circumstances, taken yet another
approach to ensuring educational equity. That approach - which seems to stem from a
mistrust of state and local education officials - is based on a procedural due process
model. A full discussion of this development is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few
examples will serve as an illustration. It should be obvious, however, that expanding this
approach - increasing the requirements for procedural safeguards, enacting accountabil-
ity measures, including competency testing requirements, and providing for educational
malpractice litigation - will not resolve many of the dilemmas raised by this section of
the Article.
The "due process" approach has been most comprehensively developed in the area
of handicapped students. Because of the stigma of the handicapped label, both courts and
Congress have required placement in the least restrictive environment, and have
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE - A GOVERNMENTAL DUTY
To PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION
To ALL CHILDREN
There is no doubt that there are a number of groups in this nation
who have been and still are being mistreated or neglected by our
society. Nor is there any doubt that the goal of enabling all children to
attain an adequate education - the ticket to their future life chances -
ought to be of paramount concern to our society. And where state and
local governments impede the attainment of that goal, the responsibility
for removing the impediments of necessity devolves upon the national
government. Yet, as I have argued, there are serious constitutional,
political, and institutional problems with the present way in which some
of these concerns are being attacked. In the post-Rodriguez era, the
federal courts have been reluctant to expand the categories of protected
classes or to find a deprivation of a fundamental right when education is
not provided equally. On the other hand, the approach that Congress
has taken - to increase the number of classes entitled to special
assistance - has raised both political concerns and concerns centered on
the nature of our federal system. And increasingly we see various "child
advocacy" groups representing different kinds of children competing
with each other for a share of a rapidly shrinking pie. This section
explores the feasibility of an alternate route, that of educational
adequacy rather than equality. Had the courts taken this route, some of
the pressures for continually expanding the number of specially
protected categories of children might have diminished.
surrounded any change in a child's placement with stringent procedural safeguards. PARC
required procedural safeguards as a constitutional obligation in any situation in which the
result could be stigmatizing. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania,
343 F. Supp. 279, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent decree). Mills required " a hearing prior to
exclusion, termination or classification into a special program." Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972). And the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 provides substantial due process guarantees whenever a change in educational
placement is proposed, requested, or refused. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976). The opportunity
to challenge placement decisions minimizes the misuse of classification and the provision
of inappropriate educational services. Administrative decisions can be appealed to the
courts for a de novo hearing. Id. § 1415(e)(2). Moreover, Congress has provided that each
child in a special education setting must have an Individualized Education Program (IEP)
with goals for ultimate placement in a regular classroom and a provision for periodic
re-evaluation. Id. §§ 1401(19), 1413(a)(11); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.340-.349 (1979). See also the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976), and its implementing regula-
tions, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.33-.36 (1979). Thus, due process safeguards are required of anyone
receiving federal funds. This approach has been taken in the case of disciplinary
suspensions and expulsions. The requirement of procedural safeguards may serve to
impede the disproportionate use of such sanctions against the minority and the poor. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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The Supreme Court in Rodriguez refused to find an affirmative duty
to provide equal education or equal access to an education. There were
no standards by which the Court could tell whether such a hypothetical
duty were satisfied or violated unless the standard were one of absolute
equality. Under such a standard if students in a high expenditure
district begin the study of foreign languages in the first grade, then all
students in the state should be able to begin foreign languages in the
first grade. If one school district can afford to offer its students
individual violin lessons, advanced organic chemistry, or a course in
movie making, then all school districts should be able to - or none.
Such a standard would mean, for example, that the students in school
districts in the state of California that spend less per pupil than Beverly
Hills are being denied an equal educational opportunity. The Court
must have feared that if state systems were constitutionally required to
equalize, either they would bankrupt themselves trying to level up to
the highest spending district, or they would level down to an equal
mediocrity.
Since "equality" was the essence of the constitutional provision
invoked to support a right to a certain level of education, whether a
student was getting his share could only be determined in comparison to
what others were getting. No baseline standard existed for that
education to which every child is entitled.
An alternative approach has been utilized where certain "disadvan-
taged" categories are concerned. Handicapped children, language-
minority children, and children of racial minorities that have been
victims of affirmative governmental discrimination are said to have a
right to an "appropriate" education suitable to their needs. This
standard requires that each child should be educated to his potential,
but it is a standard that is not and realistically could not be applied to
other children.
Professor Frank Michelman of Harvard, in a thought-provoking
article written over a decade ago, suggested an alternative approach to
that which measures educational opportunity by comparison.3 26 His focus
was not on equality of educational offerings, but on a basic level of
education that would be constitutionally protected."' Professor Michel-
man wanted to read the equal protection clause as a "minimum
protection" clause, and argued that the government is constitutionally
required to provide an adequate level of basic needs and services, or of
326. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting The Poor Through the Fourteenth Armend-
ment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
327. Id. at 18.
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what he terms "welfare rights. '328 Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion
in Rodriguez does suggest that some basic level of education might be a
constitutionally guaranteed right. But Professor Michelman failed to
provide any standards for determining what is that basic or minimally
adequate education to which every child is entitled. All Professor
Michelman told us is that disparity in educational offerings is the signal
that some children might be deprived of a basic level of education.129
Professor Michelman's approach raises the concern that the courts
will get into educational policy issues when there is no underlying
consensus as to what society wants - and will pay for - and what is
educationally sound. In terms of institutional competence, it appears to
be no easier for the courts to determine how much education each child
should be given to satisfy the constitutional duty than to determine
when relative inequalities in educational offerings constitute a constitu-
tional violation.
Some state courts have, in the area of school finance litigation, tried
to come to grips with some of these problems, and their solutions may
provide a guide to workable standards for applying the Federal
Constitution's equal protection clause. These courts, rejecting the
comparison approach taken by the plaintiffs in Rodriguez, have focused
rather on the provision of an adequate education to all children23 The
328. Michelman, supra note 45, at 659.
329. Michelman, supra note 326, at 50.
330. The Rodriguez case, as presented to the Supreme Court, followed the model used
in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). That case had
articulated a simple fiscal neutrality theory - that the quality of a child's education may
not be "a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 604. This theory was refined in subsequent cases to the following: "[Tihe
level of spending for a child's education may not be a function of [property] wealth other
than the wealth of the state as a whole." Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872
(D. Minn. 1971). The Serrano and Van Dusartz opinions drew heavily on J. Coons, W.
Clune III, & S. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (1970).
Courts in the pre-Rodriguez period seized on the "fiscal neutrality" principle to
avoid the problems raised by two cases decided in the late sixties, Burruss v. Wilkerson,
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd mem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970), and McInnis v. Shapiro,
293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322
(1969). The courts in those cases, having construed the plaintiffs' claims as seeking a
system that provided resources on the basis of educational "need," thought there were no
manageable standards for a court to determine such "need." The plaintiffs in Mclnnis
asserted that state statutes that permitted disparities in per-pupil expenditures violated
their fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and due process, since students
from districts with high property values received a good education while those from other
districts, "who [had] equal or greater educational need," were deprived of such an
education. 293 F. Supp. at 329. The court conceded that there was a presumption that
"students receiving a $1000 education are better educated than those acquiring a $600
schooling," id. at 331, but declared that there were "no 'discoverable and manageable
standards' by which a court [could] determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when
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leading case is Robinson v. Cahil1331 in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court overturned that state's school finance scheme on the ground that
it violated the state's constitutional command to the legislature to
provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools. . .. ,,332 In
construing this state constitutional provision, the court said that "[t]he
Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that education-
al opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a
child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market."3"
The New Jersey court then held that there was no relationship
between the educational needs of school districts and their tax bases. 334
It concluded that because New Jersey's system of financing education
relied heavily on local revenues, resulting in substantial disparities in
it is violated," id. at 335. The plaintiffs had demanded that "expenditures be made only on
the basis of pupils' educational needs without regard to the financial strength of local
school districts." Id. The alternative - "equal dollar expenditures for each student" - was
also dismissed by the court as inappropriate. Id. at 336. In the Burruss case, the plaintiffs
had urged that educational resources should be related to varying levels of "educational
needs." 310 F. Supp. at 573. The court, relying, on Mclnnis, rejected the plaintiffs' claim
and suggested that they seek legislative relief. The court noted that it had "neither the
knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying
needs of these students throughout the State." Id. at 574.
The fiscal neutrality theory, in attempting to avoid the Mclnnis trap, focused on
the equalization of fiscal capacity - equalizing the property tax base. Thus, despite the
arguments based on fundamental rights and suspect classes, Rodriguez was framed as a
taxpayer equity suit rather than an equal educational opportunity suit.
Some state courts followed the California Supreme Court's opinion in Serrano v.
Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Serrano II), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977), and found their state systems of financing education unconstitutional under
their state constitutions' equal protection clauses. E.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,
376 A.2d 359 (1977). Other courts explicitly rejected an approach focusing on equalizing
tax capacity. E.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 502-03, 303 A.2d 273, 288, cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973). See also Levin, supra note 13, at 1113-14.
331. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson I).
332. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
333. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. Subsequently, the legislature enacted the Public
School Education Act of 1975, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 to :7A-33 (West Supp. 1979),
which defined a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools" as one which
"provide[s] to all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic
location, the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically,
economically and socially in a democratic society." Id. § 18A:7A-4. The legislative
definition is substantially similar to the standard suggested by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Robinson I, and was affirmed by that court on the assumption that the legislature
would provide sufficient funding to support such an education. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J.
449, 464, 355 A.2d 129, 136 (1976) (Robinson V). When the New Jersey legislature failed
to fund the 1975 Act, the court enjoined the expenditure of any funds for the support of
public schools until the act was fully funded for the school year 1976-77. Robinson v.
Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 160, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (1976) (Robinson VI).
334. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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per pupil expenditures, the system failed to fulfill the mandate of the
constitution, "unless we were to suppose the unlikely proposition that
the lowest level of dollar performance happens to coincide with the
constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are
attributable to local decisions to do more than the State was obliged to
do." 3 5
The New Jersey court thus rejected a view of equal educational
opportunity as equal tax capacity, as access to equal inputs, or as a
guarantee of equal results. Instead, it adopted the view that the
educational opportunity to which each child was entitled was a
guaranteed educational floor or basic level of adequacy, allowing local
leeway beyond that level: "Nor do we say that if the State assumes the
cost of providing the constitutionally mandated education, it may not
authorize local government to go further ....
The standard articulated by the New Jersey court seems to require
of the government more than the minimum level the Supreme Court
suggested in Rodriguez might be a constitutional obligation: the "basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of
full participation in the political process. ' '337 But the Robinson standard
does not require the government to equalize all educational expendi-
tures.
More recently, the Seattle School District brought suit challenging
Washington State's school financing system." The decision in that case
also suggested a basic level of education standard. The trial court held
that the state's "paramount duty" was to guarantee sufficient funds to
support a "basic education" without relying on voted local property tax
levies.3 39 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the duty
under the state constitution went beyond the basic minimal skills of
"mere reading, writing, and arithmetic. '" 340 Echoing the language of the
New Jersey court in Robinson, it held that the constitutional duty "also
embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary
setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas. '3 4'
The court noted that these are "broad guidelines and that the effective
335. Id.
336. Id. at 520, 303 A.2d at 298.
337. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
338. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, Civ. No. 53950 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Jan. 14, 1977), affd, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
339. Slip op. at 34.




teaching and opportunities for learning these essential skills make up
the minimum of the education that is constitutionally required."3 42 Once
the state fulfills its duty of supplying every district with a basic
education, however, expenditure disparities resulting from local choice
constitutionally may exist, even if they are a direct consequence of
district wealth. As the trial court had said:
[Locally voted levies] may only be required or utilized to fund
programs, activities and support services of the district which the
state is not required to fund. In other words, if the taxpayers in a
district desire to offer an "enriched" program, that is, one which
goes beyond that required by the Constitution, then they may be
required to fund the same. 43
The Washington trial court had used several approaches, approved
by the state supreme court, to determine whether the state had, in the
absence of a legislative definition of a basic program, met its constitu-
tional duty to make "ample provision" for the education of all children
residing within its borders. One approach was to "cost out" the current
requirements imposed on school districts by state statutes and the
regulations of the State Board of Education, and measure that amount
against the amount of state funds received by the Seattle school
district.'" Another approach determined the costs associated with
operating those programs necessary for the Seattle school district to
maintain state accreditation . 5 Applying these standards, the resources
available for education under existing law were insufficient in the
Seattle school district. Thus, for the Washington courts, that educational
opportunity that is constitutionally protected is whatever the state
determines is basic. Above and beyond a basic or minimum program, the
level of a child's education may be determined by district wealth and
effort.3 46
342. Id. at 518, 585 P.2d at 95.
343. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, Civ. No. 53950 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Jan. 14, 1977), slip op. at 24 (emphasis in original.)
344. Id. at 54-56.
345. Id. at 68-69. A third approach, less defensible than the other two, designated the
"collective wisdom" approach, involved determining the costs for Seattle of employing "the
statewide average per pupil deployment of certified staff and nonsalary related costs for
the maintenance and operation of the common school program for a normal range
student." Id. at 53. The Washington Supreme Court's discussion of the trial court's
methods is found in 90 Wash. 2d at 533-35, 528 P.2d at 102-03.
346. The Serrano court's approach was quite different than that of the Washington
courts. Under Serrano, if tax capacity is not equalized, then spending differences among
districts are not constitutionally permissible even if the state were to fund fully a program
of "basic education." On the other hand, the California court's approach seems not to
[VOL. 39
EQUAL PROTECTION PREDICAMENT
This brief look at two recent state school finance cases suggests that
courts can articulate a principle of a right to an adequate education,
without getting into issues of educational policy and "legislating" the
kind of education to which a child is entitled. Nor is the state required
to provide the same education to all children. The approach these courts
have taken is to return to the legislature the task of defining what is an
adequate education for all children.
It could be argued that these courts have articulated an empty
principle. If the states can define what is basic, they can exclude
kindergarten, foreign languages, or even reading and arithmetic.
require the state to provide any particular amount of education - as long as what is
provided is not wealth-related.
The Washington legislature has recently adopted a definition of "basic education"
in an attempt to comply with the court's order. The act, known as the Basic Education Act
of 1977, requires the state to provide "fully sufficient" funding for specified programs and
services. Ch. 359, 1977 Wash. Laws 1606. Foreign language instruction is excluded from
the definition of basic education, but (along with instruction in traffic safety) may be
provided at the discretion of the district, if paid for with locally raised funds. The
Washington act, in contrast to the New Jersey act, see note 333 supra, clearly defines basic
education in terms of inputs rather than outputs.
The West Virginia Supreme Court has provided the most expansive definition of
that education constitutionally required under a "thorough and efficient" clause, although
it remanded the case to the trial court to obtain the testimony of expert witnesses and also
encouraged the legislature to establish standards. Pauley v. Kelly, - W. Va. ., 255
S.E.2d 859 (1979). The court said that a thorough and efficient system of schools "develops
• . . the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and
happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." Id. at -, 755
S.E.2d at 877.
The court went on to include the elements in this definition:
development in every child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add,
subtract, multiply and divide numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent
that the child will be equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons
and issues that affect his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge of his or
her total environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life work - to know
his or her options; (5) work-training and advanced academic training as the child may
intelligently choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such as
music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral and
abstract, to facilitate compatability with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities, instructional
materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local supervision to prevent waste and
to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency.
Id.
A suit has been filed in Maryland, challenging that state's school finance scheme
on state as well as federal constitutional grounds. Somerset County Bd. of Educ. v.
Hornbeck, Case No. A-58438 (Cir. Ct. Balto. City, filed Feb. 15, 1979). Thus we may
eventually have a Maryland Court of Appeals definition of what is a "thorough and
efficient" educational system as required by Article VIII, Section 1 of the Maryland
Constitution. An earlier challenge to Maryland's school finance scheme, on federal equal
protection grounds was dismissed on plaintiffs motion after a ruling that education was
not a fundamental interest. Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972).
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However, there are two limiting principles. One is the absolute minimal
education that the Rodriguez Court hinted might be a constitutional
right, "the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights
of speech and of full participation in the political process."" This
limiting principle was applied in Board of Education, Levittown Union
Free School District v. Nyquist," in which a New York state trial court
found that large concentrations of functionally illiterate high school
graduates in the urban districts of New York State were absolutely
deprived of an education by the state school funding statute.4 9 The court
thus held that the statute violated the federal equal protection clause
under Rodriguez as well as the state constitution. The other limiting
principle is the requirement articulated in several state cases that the
necessary skills to compete in today's labor market be provided.'
Minimal basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic are clearly not
enough in today's technological society.
What the courts seem to be suggesting in these school finance cases
is that a state must be concerned with the educational needs of its
children. Indeed, by providing publicly supported, compulsory schooling,
all states have already expressed this concern. A state cannot meet its
concerns by a system that relies heavily on the haphazard location of
property wealth and the whims of local voters.
The standard articulated by many of the recent school finance cases
for determining whether a duty under the state constitution to provide
education equitably has been met is partly a negative one. Basic
educational opportunities may not be a function of local district fiscal
capacity (reflecting municipal and education overburdens as well as
property wealth), and the willingness of local voters to approve local tax
levies. The standard is also partly affirmative. It is an "education need"
standard under which the state guarantees an educational floor and
permits localities to choose the level of program they desire to provide
beyond the basic state-provided program.
Is this a model that courts could follow within the framework of the
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution? Can that clause
encompass a right to an "adequate" or "basic" education for all children?
Of course, there are differences - at least superficially - between the
constitutional claim made in Rodriguez and that made under state
347. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
348. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
349. Id. at 534-35, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.
350. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295; Seattle School Dist.
No. 1 v. Washington, 90 Wash. 2d at 517, 585 P.2d at 94.
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constitutions. Education is not mentioned in the Federal Constitution
and is explicitly mandated by state constitutions. In addition, the
constitutional claim in the state school finance cases is raised under the
duty imposed on the state legislature to provide a "thorough and
efficient" education."'3 5' But every state constitution treats education as
an important public service, essential to the well-being of the govern-
ment itself, and not as a statutory benefit that can be repealed at will.
Thus, the equal protection clause should mean that some level of
education - if the government provides education at all - is
constitutionally guaranteed. An analogous argument is made in the
voting and criminal appeals cases. There is no federal constitutional
obligation to provide the right to vote for certain offices"I or access to an
appeal from a criminal conviction,'" but once provided, the equal
protection clause obligates the government to provide equal access for
all." To carry the analogy further, the requirement to provide effective
access to an appeal need not mean absolute equality. An indigent is
guaranteed a lawyer, not the most competent lawyer he could hire with
unlimited private funds. Similarly, then, where a state provides
education, the equal protection clause should obligate the state to
provide a basic or adequate education for all.
If the Federal Constitution's equal protection clause were read as
creating an affirmative obligation to provide an adequate education to
all children, the courts need not, as feared, become super school boards,
specifying the minimum educational services that must be provided. * '
The court's role could be merely to command the state to devise a system
that provides for all children - regardless of where they live or who
they are - that education the state has already indicated it considers
351. The exact wording varies. Some states use "thorough" or "efficient"; some use the
phrase "general and uniform" or require that the state make "ample provision for the
education of all children." For a listing of the various state constitutional standards, see
Levin, supra note 13, at 1103 n.18.
352. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 629 (1968) ("States do
have latitude in determining whether certain public officials shall be selected by election
or chosen by appointment .... ").
353. As the Supreme Court noted in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956), "It is
true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or
a right to appellate review at all."
354. See, e.g., id.: "But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review
can do so in a way that discriminates .... " See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).




basic.35 Moreover, this approach has the advantage that a finding of
intentional governmental discrimination against a particular class need
not be a prerequisite. 357
This approach requires states to provide varying levels of resources
according to the varying prices of education in different areas,38 the
varying educational starting points of different children 59 and the
varying capacities of school districts to raise the revenues to fund an
adequate education. 360 There is some accommodation to the white middle
class, which cannot have itself designated as a specially protected group
entitled to special treatment, while at the same time the special needs of
various disadvantaged groups are not ignored. If children such as the
language disabled, the handicapped, and the economically disadvan-
taged receive an education that will provide them with sufficient skills
to compete in today's labor market in the context of ensuring all
children such skills, then the legal and moral imperatives may coincide.
Requiring the state to provide an adequate level of education for all
children, but allowing some choice for programs beyond that level,
meets the demands of equal treatment while still preserving some
libertarian principles. The clash between egalitarian and libertarian
notions need not be total, and the tensions between minorities and
non-minorities may be diminshed.
356. Courts making these commands would not be picking and choosing among public
services, deciding, for example, t.. at education "is a fundamental interest and recreation
is not." Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, supra note
46, at 93. The courts would merely be deciding that since the state has declared the
fundamental importance of education, making it compulsory and public, it must ensure a
basic level of education for all. Whatever the merit of a general concern over judicial
definition of what is a fundamental interest, or of how much of that fundamental interest
is enough that concern is not appropriate to education. See text accompanying notes 76 to
94 supra.
357. Cf. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977) (vacating and remanding for
reconsideration in light of decision requiring showing of discriminatory intent a district
court determination that state's veterans' preference statute violated equal protection
rights of females); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265 (1977) (proof of discriminatory intent required to sustain finding that Village's
decision not to vary zoning laws to permit low-income housing project violates fourteenth
amendment).
358. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc.
2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 90
Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). These cases are discussed in Levin, supra note 13, at
1104-05, 1114-19. For an analysis of cost differentials, see B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, & C.
SANDOVAL, THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION IN CITIES 6-52 (1973).
359. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 94 Misc.
2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
360. Id. See also B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, & C. SANDOVAL, supra note 358, at 53-68.
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Finally, establishing a basic level of education for all children -
either as a right guaranteed by the equal protection clause or as a
national legislative concern - may bring into sharper focus the
question whether public schools are to be required to provide the most
appropriate education for those at the extremes, such as the very
severely handicapped. The extent to which imposing the societal
obligation to provide a minimally satisfactory life for the severely
handicapped on the public schools, in a time of declining enrollments
and other fiscal pressures, may detract from the traditional educational
function of the public schools should be more closely examined.
Despite the fact that there are still more questions than answers, it
seems that if we shift our focus from special and competing categories of
children, to concentrate on articulating a standard of basic education for
all children, the answers we get may be more sensible - and more
enduring.
